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1 
Introduction 
 
 Any visitor to Paris today will probably pass through the Bir Hakeim metro stop, 
the station closest to the Eiffel Tower.  It takes its name from the victory of the Free 
French Forces in Libya over German General Erwin Rommel’s joint Italian-German 
forces.  With so few triumphs to celebrate, this commemoration of a World War Two 
victory is nearly unique in France.  The Second World War is not a topic that most 
French people want to discuss.  Far better to talk about the Great War and French 
heroism at Verdun.  The Second World War is too complicated and too ambiguous to be 
a source of national pride.  But nevertheless it is an unavoidable part of France’s history, 
with a legacy contemporaries and modern day scholars alike have been forced to contend 
with.  This legacy has given rise to myths and much debate.1  Some have tried to paint the 
occupation as igniting a heroic outpouring of patriotism, while others have seen 
cowardice and culpability.  The truth lies somewhere in the middle.  The defeat France 
suffered in May and June 1940, though cataclysmic and shocking to contemporaries, is 
far less interesting than its aftermath.  In four years of foreign occupation, France 
suffered deprivation and fear on a nationwide scale, a fate which molded her present and 
changed her future. 
Historical Context 
 
When Germany launched Case Yellow against Western Europe on May 10, 1940, 
it was not without warning signs.  Throughout the 1930’s Adolf Hitler’s Germany had 
been rearming and acting in open defiance of the 1919 Treaty of Versailles, which had 
been designed to curb its power and potential aggression.  For a myriad of reasons (that 
                                                
1 Robert Gildea, Marianne in Chains (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2003) 4. 
2 
have been the study of many books), France was ill-prepared to meet this threat, in spite 
of the mounting warning sings.  And so, in under two months, France fell to the German 
army. 
Eight months prior, the opening guns of World War Two had been sounded.  On 
September 1, 1939, Nazi Germany invaded Poland, decimating Europe’s uneasy peace.  
Within days both Great Britain and France had rushed to Poland’s defense, declaring war 
on Germany.  Despite their apparent eagerness to enter the fray, however, both nations 
waited on Germany’s next move in what became known as the phony war, or le drôle de 
guerre.   
Case Yellow abruptly ended this period of expectant inactivity.  Bypassing the 
Maginot Line that stretched along France’s borders from Switzerland to Luxembourg, the 
Germans instead invaded through the north, entering neutral Belgium, Luxembourg, and 
the Netherlands, as well as France’s Ardennes Forest.  Within ten days German forces 
reached the Atlantic Coast, splitting the Allied forces.  The British Expeditionary Force 
and members of the French army were evacuated at Dunkirk onto waiting British war 
ships in an attempt to salvage what remained of the beaten armies, to fight another day.  
On June 11, Paris was declared an open city and three days later the German army 
entered the French capital.  The world watched with horror as the storied French military 
crumbled in the span of six weeks under the Nazi onslaught.   
Thousands of civilians from northern and eastern France fled in the face of 
invasion, inundating the southern provinces with refugees and beginning the war years 
with a significant stress on resources, including food, petrol, and even impacting the 
3 
conditions of the roads.2  The French called this mass migration l’exode, and it included 
civilians from all social classes.3  Those who remained in Paris described the city as 
empty: shops closed, streets deserted, trains crowded beyond capacity and running 
constantly to evacuate as many civilians as possible.4  For most people, no real 
destination existed – anywhere but here, anywhere to be safe from the army chomping at 
their heels.  The exode was a dramatic, but temporary, demographic shift.  Still, it 
foreshadowed the troubled times to come, revealing the inadequacy of French trade 
routes and supply lines when placed under pressure, and the inability of the government 
to calm the nation in a time of chaos. 
Overpowered by the superiority of German forces, the French sued for an 
armistice, which was reached on June 22.  Three days later, France officially surrendered.  
Under the armistice terms, all France was to be disarmed.  In addition, the country was 
divided into zones. Alsace and Moselle, long a source of Germano-French tensions, were 
annexed into the Third Reich and cultural vestiges such as speaking French or wearing 
berets were outlawed.5  Alsaciens and inhabitants of the Moselle who had fled with the 
exode were only permitted to return home if they could prove they were not of Jewish 
descent, and that their families had been in residence prior to 1918.6  The Nord Pas de 
Calais was closed off from the rest of France and governed from Belgium as part of a 
                                                
2 Ian Ousby,  Occupation – The Ordeal of France 1940-1944. (New York: St Martin’s, 
1998) 45. 
3 L’exode translates to exodus. 
4 Simone de Beauvoir, “War Journal.” In Defeat and Beyond: An Anthology of French 
Wartime Writing, 1940-45, ed Germaine & Bernauer. (New York: Pantheon Books, 
1970) 149. 
5 Richard Vinen, The Unfree French.  (New Haven :Yale University, 2006) 104. 
6 Ousby, Occupation, 104. 
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German-administered military zone.7  This stopped any movement in or out, isolating it 
from neighboring regions.  The north and east, including Paris and extending down along 
the Atlantic Coast, were occupied, placed directly under German control and answering 
ultimately to Berlin.   
The Occupied Zone ended at the demarcation line, which divided it from the Free 
Zone to the south.  The demarcation line seems somewhat arbitrary – it did not follow 
any natural landmarks, and ran haphazardly across departmental lines, even splitting 
some towns in two.8  What at first glance appears illogical, though, in fact reflects the 
enormous power imbalance between France and Germany in 1940.  Germany held the 
French capital, the richest agricultural lands and the majority of French industry.  They 
controlled access to the English Channel and the Atlantic coast.  Perhaps most 
importantly though, stopping short of a full territorial occupation allowed the Germans to 
preserve their own resources.  Maintaining French bureaucracy spared German personnel 
for more valuable tasks in Berlin and on the Eastern Front.  Additionally, by keeping the 
French administration in place and working with them through official channels, the 
Germans gave the French government a vested interest in collaboration.  And, should the 
need arise, German forces felt comfortable in the knowledge that occupying the 
remainder of the country would pose little challenge. 
France’s government had been on the run since the beginning of May 1940.  From 
Paris, it bounced from Tours to Bordeaux, staying a step ahead of both l’exode and the 
German offensive.  But geographic displacement was nothing compared to the turmoil 
                                                
7 Lynne Taylor, Between Resistance and Collaboration: Popular Protest in Northern 
France, 1940-1945 (New York: St Martin’s, 2000) 13. 
8 Vinen The Unfree French 102. 
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within the French government.  Prime minister Paul Reynaud was facing mounting 
dissension and resigned on June 16.  His replacement was Marshall Philippe Pétain, the 
great hero of World War I, revered by the whole nation.  Pétain’s government favored an 
“honorable” peace with Germany and immediately sought a cease-fire.9  After signing an 
armistice with Germany, the new government headquartered itself in Vichy, a spa town 
in the Auvergne, located some distance south of the demarcation line.   
The choice of Vichy is another decision that feels arbitrary, however it too can be 
explained.  Essentially, Vichy was secure.  It was removed from the politics, often 
socialist, of larger southern towns like Marseille or Toulouse.10  It was a safe distance 
from the coast, the demarcation line, and the Swiss border so the Germans felt secure.  Its 
newness provided a means for the French government to start over.  Under Pétain, the 
Third Republic, which had existed since the Franco-Prussian War of 1871, was dissolved 
and replaced by the French State, or l’Etat Français.  Unofficially, it became known as 
Vichy, adopting the name of its chosen location, the name it has been known by ever 
since. 
Vichy’s exact status has been the subject of serious debate.  Some have called it a 
puppet state, while others insist on its autonomy.11  Even more so in retrospect, Vichy has 
taken on a divisive role, as the responsibility of the French in Occupied France has been 
subject to reassessment by historians.  Ultimate authority derived from Berlin and 
policies were only enacted when they did not contradict existing German policies. Vichy 
was internationally recognized by contemporaries, and even had a United States embassy 
                                                
9 Werner Rings, Life With the Enemy: Collaboration and Resistance in Hitler’s Europe 
1939-1945 (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Co, 1982) 113. 
10 Vinen, The Unfree French, 48. 
11 Ousby, Occupation, 67. 
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in the first years of the war.12  It had its own bureaucracy, and particularly in the Free 
Zone was active in promulgating policies and seeking autonomy.  However, this pursuit 
of autonomy could be a doubled-edged sword.  Often in attempting to prove their 
effectiveness and gain more power, French administration and police found themselves 
performing the German’s dirty work under the guise of independent action.13  The best 
example of this is the role of the French police in rounding up the country’s Jewish 
population – of the seven internment camps in France, six were run by the French, who 
also played an active role in marginalizing and eventually arresting and deporting Jews, 
especially between 1940-1943.14   
Perhaps the greatest condemnation of Vichy comes from its active espousal and 
pursuit of collaboration.15  Working with German authorities has been termed the “shield 
theory” by many apologists and by Vichy authorities themselves when they stood trial for 
treason following Liberation.16  Ostensibly, Vichy created a safeguard between the 
Germans and the French population at large, and Vichy’s attempts at collaboration 
mitigated national suffering and prevented “Polandization.”17  It seems clear though, that 
collaboration implied slightly more than this defense mechanism – at its worst, it caused 
Vichy to actively aid and even promote rounding up France’s Jewish population.  In fact 
the decision to deport Jewish children along with adults came from a top Vichy minister, 
                                                
12 Vinen The Unfree French, 50. 
13 Gildea, Marianne in Chains, 255. 
14 Vinen, The Unfree French, 135. 
15 Robert O. Paxton, Vichy France: Old Guard and New Order, 1940-1944 (New York: 
Alfred A. Knopf, 1972) 51. 
16 Paxton, Vichy France, 358. 
17 Paxton, Vichy France, 359.  Polandization refers to the extreme sufferings of the Poles 
under Nazi occupation, including mass exterminations and forced ghettos, taking 
enormous tolls on the civilian population.  It was often used as a reference to contrast the 
experiences of occupied nations. 
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purportedly to “keep families together.”18  Clearly Vichy shared more than a little of the 
responsibility. 
Thesis 
The chaos of World War Two provided the background and impetus for the 
events in France between 1940 and 1944.  Though the war may have been as distant as 
Russia or the Pacific Ocean, its impact reverberated into the heart of France and dictated 
the course of the occupation, determining the way that French civilians experienced the 
war.  It is easy to lose sight of these civilians amidst the drama of earth-changing political 
and military events.  The scale of life, however, does not lessen the importance of the 
French civilian’s experience. 
Journals and other contemporary sources are the best means of piecing together 
the civilian experience in Occupied France.  They come from rural and urban locations 
throughout the country, presenting a kaleidoscope of personalities and experiences.  In 
search of the average civilian experience, though, this diversity is problematic.  Not 
surprisingly, there is no discernible single experience that ran throughout all of France 
and all of its citizens.  Hunger, deprivation, and fear may have been present everywhere, 
but in varying degrees that depended on a number of factors. 
One of these factors was population size.  A larger native population denoted a 
larger importance to any town or city, and it was in France’s densely populated areas 
where the majority of Germans lived and worked.  As cultural and administrative centers, 
cities naturally attracted the occupying power, which was looking to work with and 
manipulate these institutions.  A highly populated area also provided the critical mass of 
                                                
18 Ousby, Occupation, 191. 
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people needed for enterprises such as the black market or collaboration or resistance to 
succeed. 
There were some areas that drew the attention of the German occupiers, not 
because of their significance as cultural or administrative centers, but because of their 
strategic locations.  The best examples of this, where geography became a crucial 
determinant of occupation policy, are France’s coastal areas.  Considered vulnerable to 
seaborne attack, the Germans stretched the demarcation line to include the entire Channel 
and Atlantic Coasts.19  Though important towns dotted the coastline, most notably Nantes 
and Bordeaux, the main motivation for extending the occupation into these areas was not 
to control these cities, but to control the coast.  In so doing, Germany also controlled 
what (and who) passed into and out of France by water.  Eventually, decrees were even 
passed demanding that civilians move away from the vulnerable coastline, transforming it 
into a military zone.20  Normandy, along France’s Channel coast, was the most important 
region to have its occupation experience dictated by geography.  Judged to be a likely 
point for Allied landings, the Germans were careful to man the Norman coast from the 
outset of the war, long before such a threat was likely.21 
Though never a hard and fast rule, belonging to the right social class could 
usually ease many of the hardships of occupation, even in cities or along the tactically 
important coast.  Wealth or connections were the most effective means of lessening the 
                                                
19 Vinen, The Unfree French, 101. 
20 Louis Guilloux, Carnets 1921-1944 (Paris: Gallimard, 1982) 299.  It should be noted 
that though these decrees were passed, they were not universally applied or obeyed.  
Often the main concern was removing the most vulnerable portions of the population, 
such as children or the elderly.  Moreover, the coast only became forbidden to all French 
citizens in April 1944 and, even then, enforcement was uneven. 
21 Marie-Louise Osmont, The Normandy Diary of Marie-Louise Osmont (New York: 
Random House, 1994). 
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day-to-day difficulties of the occupation, and according to one contemporary observer, 
for many Frenchmen living through the occupation, their lifestyle was as imbued as the 
Rights of Man – those accustomed to luxury resorted to any means to maintain it.22 
Though social factors were clearly important, material factors were the greatest 
determinants of the French civilian’s experience of the occupation.  Of material factors, 
by far the most important was economic – it virtually defined the experience of most 
French citizens.  Most memories of the war revolve around various aspects of the 
economic situation: waiting in endless queues to buy food, ration coupons in hand; 
bicycling into the countryside in search of provisions when they failed to materialize at 
markets in town; developing substitutes to replace missing necessities; hiding signs of 
wealth to avoid requisitioning or denunciation.  Scarcity and availability provided the 
undertones for the occupation, nationwide.23  With only two months of active war and 
four years of passive occupation, it is no surprise that economic realities reigned supreme 
as the greatest burden of the occupation period. 
Analyzing the occupation from both a rural and urban perspective illuminates the 
similarities and differences between the two, based on each of the factors described above 
– geography, population density, social class, material scarcity and availability – as well 
as many others.   The main difference between rural and urban occupation was one of 
degrees.  Urban areas were most often the epicenter of the German presence, causing 
these populations to endure the most friction between the power of the occupier, and the 
forced lot of the occupied.  By contrast, most towns and villages only saw German troops 
at the beginning and end of the war, when they were on the move.  Cities were also at an 
                                                
22 Alfred Fabre-Luce, Journal de la France 1939-1944 (Paris: Fayard, 1969) 409. 
23 Gildea, Marianne in Chains, 2. 
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economic disadvantage.  Often long distances from points of agricultural production, they 
were dependent on trade to supply their markets.  When trade routes shrank or 
occasionally collapsed, urban populations were the first to be beset by hunger and 
scarcity.  Rural populations, on the other hand, gained increasing economic power during 
the war.  Their proximity to agricultural production, even if they themselves were not 
involved in production, gave them specialized access to supplies.   
The greatest similarity that urban and rural France shared was the plain fact that 
both were occupied.  While certain factors could mitigate the effects of occupation, the 
occupation itself remained in place.  That meant the countrywide imposition of a 
controlled economy, German administrators and soldiers, and subjugation to a hostile 
foreign power.  Through an examination of the social and material factors that defined 
the occupation, we can come closer to understanding the intricacies of daily life in 
Occupied France, as well as the legacy it left behind. 
Examining urban and rural experiences in conjunction using the common factors 
that determined the course of the occupation in each allows us to come closer to 
ultimately defining the average experience of the individual civilians who lived in 
Occupied France.  Or rather, it allows us to find several average experiences, accounting 
for differences throughout France.  Understanding the daily lives of civilians in one area 
helps illuminate circumstances in another, ultimately illuminating the nationwide 
consequences of the occupation, as experienced by ordinary French citizens. 
11 
Ch 1.  The Urban Experience of Occupation 
 
Introduction 
 
 On June 14, 1940, the day the German army entered Paris, sixteen Parisians killed 
themselves.24  It is impossible to determine how many of these were the result of 
invasion.  It can be said, though, that suicide historically had a decidedly republican 
flavor in France, in the style of ancient Rome, that would have been directly in opposition 
to Nazi totalitarianism.25  So began the German occupation of France’s northern cities.  
The German presence hit the urban areas of the Occupied Zone hard – Paris, Tours, 
Bordeaux, Dijon, to name a few.  The cities were subject to a new controlled economy 
and rationing system.  Their resultant effects metamorphisized the local economy.  A 
heavy German administrative and military presence forced constant contact between the 
two populations.  This contact forced the difficult question of how to navigate occupation 
– pressure to collaborate or resist met pressure to simply see the occupation safely 
through.  Urban society in Occupied France between 1940-1944 was markedly different 
than what came both before and after. 
 As of 1940, Paris alone played host to some 40,000 Germans.26  They held both 
administrative and military positions, but, regardless of their official capacity, they 
radically changed the demography and the environment of the city.  Though Paris, which 
served as headquarters of the Occupation, had the highest concentration of Germans 
anywhere in France, other cities were subject to similar occupations resulting in similar 
changes. 
                                                
24 Richard Vinen, The Unfree French (New Haven: Yale University, 2006) 14. 
25 Vinen, The Unfree French, 15. 
26 Vinen, The Unfree French, 109. 
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 The changes wrought by the occupation seem obvious, but in fact they were very 
complex and had extended consequences, like a societal ripple effect.  The first, and 
probably the most important, step the Germans took was to transform French industrial 
and agricultural production into a controlled economy, safeguarded by a system of 
rationing.  “The German economy required French material resources, agricultural 
products and industrial goods.  German industry needed French manpower for its 
factories and the military needed it for its construction projects on the Atlantic Coast.”27  
This spurred inflation and led to the development of several concentric black markets, 
supplying the goods unavailable through the official market with varying degrees of price 
extortion.  Wage controls compounded these problems, in what was effectively a crisis 
economy: a supplier’s market built on scarcity and disproportionately high demand.   
The heavy German presence in urban centers opened the thorny question of how 
to proceed: to resist, to collaborate, or to look for a middle path.  Varying degrees of 
economic collaboration existed in cities, as did multiple forms and interpretations of 
resistance.  Defining collaboration and resistance became extremely difficult, most 
notably in the instances of romantic or sexual relationships between French women and 
German soldiers, better known as horizontal collaboration.  Most French citizens fell 
firmly in neither of the two camps, collaborator or resistor, and instead sought simply to 
navigate through a changing society, and outlast the Occupation in peace. 
 German occupation in urban areas is best seen through the eyes of the people that 
experienced it firsthand. Alfred Fabre-Luce lived in Paris during the Occupation and 
recorded his observations in a journal.  The journal begins in 1939 as the French 
                                                
27 Frederic Spotts, A Shameful Peace: How French Artists and Intellectuals Survived the 
Nazi Occupation (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008) 35. 
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anticipate German attack and continues through Liberation, in 1944.  Prior to the war 
Fabre-Luce was employed as a writer, working in fiction, biographies, histories and 
essays.  During the war, though, he felt compelled to document instead his own changing 
world.  His journal is highly critical of contemporary society and devotes particular 
attention to the prices and availability of food, which he sees as reflective of the 
occupation as a whole.28 
 Fabre-Luce’s contemporary, Henri Drouot, lived in Dijon, the provincial capital 
of Burgundy.  He began a journal to document the Occupation after returning from the 
defeated Western Front in late August 1940, where he had served as a reservist.29  He 
continued writing until September 1944, when the Allied armies liberated Dijon.  Trained 
as a historian, specializing in the 16th century of his native Burgundy, Drouot turned his 
analytical eye to the events around him.  While personal and familial details have been 
deleted from his journal by the publishers, it still retains the bulk of his observations.30  
He cautions his readers in an introduction that his writing reflects perception much more 
than reality.  Nevertheless, his diary provides frequent reports on prices and availability 
in the marketplace, war news, and local events and rumors surrounding the German 
occupiers. 
 Together, the two men present similar pictures – of urban populations dominated 
by insecurity and preoccupied with their own day-to-day survival.  Neither of the men 
makes mention of participating in any form of resistance or collaboration, but seem to 
walk a middle road, almost as conscientious objectors to the entire affair.  Their shared 
                                                
28 Alfred Fabre-Luce, Journal de la France 1939-1944 (Paris: Fayard, 1969). 
29 Henri Drouot, Notes d’un Dijonnais Pendant l’Occupation Allemande 1940-44 (Dijon: 
Editions Universitaires de Dijon: 1998). 
30 Drouot, Notes d’un Dijonnais, xxi. 
14 
preoccupation with food availability and prices is extremely telling as to the prevailing 
atmosphere within France.  According to historian Richard Vinen, “The French talked 
about food obsessively.”31  Indeed, while occupation obviously had large social and 
political impacts, its biggest effects, and certainly the primary concern of contemporaries, 
seem to have been economic.  Historians, though acknowledging this, have tended to 
focus on other aspects of urban occupation – the arts, intellectuals, and especially 
collaboration and resistance.  Recently, there has been a move towards examining what 
are perhaps the more mundane aspects of urban occupation – price controls, the black 
market, everyday Franco-German interactions, etc.  This chapter follows in that vein, and 
attempts to define the average French citizen’s experience of urban life under Nazi 
Occupation.  
Economic Conditions 
 The actual Occupation disrupted the economic order of France significantly more 
than invasion had in May and June 1940.  The invasion drew farmers and workers out of 
the economic sector and into the armed forces, but most of these – with the exception of 
prisoners of war of whom there were some 1.5 million, no small loss to the nation’s 
economy – returned to their civilian lives within days of the armistice. 32  Occupation, by 
contrast, was built around the idea that France should help Germany.  This help took 
many forms but by far the most tangible, and arguably the most important, was the 
requisitioning of goods.  Known as the ravitaillement, this requisition necessitated 
German control over production and supply, to ensure that the desired goods were 
produced and sent back to the Reich.  In order to ensure this management, the Nazi 
                                                
31 Vinen, The Unfree French, 215. 
32 Robert Gildea, Marianne in Chains (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2003) 67. 
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occupiers introduced a controlled economy in Occupied France.  One of its key features 
was rationing.   
 Rationing was essential to the effective operation of a combined Franco-German 
economy.  It regulated virtually all consumer goods, including clothing, tobacco, and 
soap.  Most importantly, though, it controlled food.  Cheese, eggs, meat, milk, butter, 
fats, oil, bread, wine, potatoes, fish – all were controlled by rationing. 33  Beginning in 
August 1940, each citizen registered with their local suppliers – butchers, bakers, etc.  
This registration was then noted on a citywide level and ration cards were made available 
periodically, usually on a monthly basis, in the mairie, or town hall. 34  A ration card 
determined how much of a type of food – in pounds of meat, for example – a person was 
allotted each week.  The Germans were not interested in needlessly antagonizing the 
French, so food allotments were not intended to starve the local population.  Nonetheless, 
hunger has been pointed to as perhaps the predominant feature of the Occupation. 35 
 Rationing was not conducted uniformly, but rather by breaking the population 
into subsections, based on age, gender and other needs.  Group E included children under 
age 3.  J1 encompassed children ages 3-6, J2 children 6-13, and J3 ages 13-21.  The 
majority of adults were in group A, ages 21-70 with no special circumstances.  T, from 
the French travail, meaning work, covered adults ages 21-70 performing heavy manual 
labor.  Group C – for cultivateur, or farmer – referred to agricultural workers, whose 
allotments were often smaller as they were assumed to have ready access to additional 
food sources, by virtue of their labor.  Adults over 70 were in group V, for vieux, 
                                                
33 Ian Ousby, Occupation – The Ordeal of France 1940-1944 (New York: St. Martin’s, 
1998) 116. 
34 Ousby, Occupation, 116. 
35 Gildea, Marianne in Chains, 1. 
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meaning old. 36  Special categories also existed for pregnant or nursing mothers.  These 
divisions existed to meet special needs within the population, for example by providing 
extra milk for children, or giving larger portions to those performing valuable manual 
labor.  Despite these attempts at specialization, the rationing system almost always 
represented a dramatic drop in caloric intake – prior to the war an average adult 
consumed approximately 2500 calories a day, but this had dropped to between 1200-1500 
by the end of the occupation in 1944.37 
 Obviously rationing could not meet demand.  So, French citizens turned to 
alternative, extralegal means to procure the goods they needed.  An extensive black 
market developed and flourished in answer to this pervasive need.  The black market 
forged a link between the countryside and cities during the war, and it is difficult to 
examine one side in isolation.  The countryside played the crucial role of supplier, 
supplementing the diet of town and city dwellers throughout the nation.  This took place 
in a number of ways, and there were several concentric black markets.  The smallest 
circle involved only immediate family and friends.  This often led to urbanites 
rediscovering country cousins who could provide them with much needed packages of 
food.  These packages were known as colis familiaux.  In 1942 alone, 13.5 million were 
mailed throughout France.38  Often this smaller market, sometimes called the marche 
amical, was based on barter economics, or even in some cases on the promise of future 
payment. 
                                                
36 Vinen, The Unfree French, 22. 
37 Ousby, Occupation, 118. 
38 Ousby, Occupation, 127. 
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 The black market grew wider and wider outward from this family circle.  The 
bigger the market, the higher the price.  The government-set price of butter in 1942 was 
43 francs a kilo.  On the marche amical it sold for 69 francs, and on the black market for 
107 francs. 39  This drastic difference in cost reflects the persistence of demand, even in 
the face of steadily rising prices.  Fear of denunciation to the German authorities had 
some effect in maintaining relatively fair costs, but as this example of butter prices 
illustrates, not by much.  The market was at it widest in big cities like Paris or Tours.  In 
these urban centers it often relied not on familial ties but on anonymity.  Whatever its 
size or prices, the black market became an integral part of life under occupation.  Nearly 
everyone in France participated in it somehow, whether as buyers or suppliers, or on a 
large or small scale.40  It became fundamental to survival.  It has been estimated that in 
1942 an average Parisian got 1725 calories from rations, 200 from the black market and 
an additional 200 from colis familiaux.41  
 A parallel black market existed for ration cards.  These tickets functioned 
essentially as a second form of currency and quickly became highly prized commodities 
– as Fabre-Luce says, the most valuable form of money.42  Not only were false cards 
created, but the originals were also stolen at every stage of production and distribution.43  
                                                
39 Michel Cepede, Agriculture et Alimentation en France Durant la IIe Guerre Mondiale 
(Paris: Genin, 1961) 335. 
40 Lynne Taylor, The Black Market in Occupied Northern France, 1940-4, Contemporary 
European History Vol. 6 (Cambridge: Cambridge University, July 1997) 175. 
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In addition, whether fake or real, a furious trade in ration cards took place.  Clothing 
tickets were the most popular to trade away, as they were arguably the least essential.44  
This trade allowed even those without a surplus of francs to participate in the black 
market. 
 Despite the prevalence of the black market, and perhaps aggravated by the failure 
of the rationing system, shortages persisted throughout the Occupation.  There simply 
were not enough of the necessities to meet the population’s demands.  In the Occupied 
Zone, meat, bread and potatoes were constantly undersupplied.  This was felt particularly 
hard in urban areas, where desperate citizens occasionally turned to eating cats, pigeons, 
and even guinea pigs.45  In 1940 a typical adult in Paris consumed 350 grams of bread a 
day.  By 1943 this had dropped to 180 grams a day.46   
 Food was not the only scarcity.  The German army requisitioned as much leather 
as they could get their hands on to furnish their soldiers with boots.47  Leather 
requisitioning began as early as fall 1940 but seems to have lasted throughout the war.  In 
the absence of available leather, shoes were soled using wood, cork, or occasionally even 
paper.48  It is here that we can begin to see the resourcefulness of the French population.  
Parisian women, known in peacetime for their elegance and style, saw no need to 
surrender this image to the war.  When perms became unavailable, they turned to 
elaborate hats, decorated with flowers or birds.49  For these women, there was no 
sacrificing style.  Tobacco, a necessity for much of the population, was also subject to 
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requisitioning, once again to fill the needs of the German army.  Already by April 1941, 
Henri Drouot reports that there was simply none left in the city of Dijon.50  A new tabac 
national was developed at the domestic level, using a mixture of dried grass and herbs.51  
This was an example of the système D, from the French se débrouiller meaning to 
manage or get by, a celebrated result of occupation.  When coffee beans ran short, roasted 
acorns took their place.  Liquorices and even boiled pumpkins were used to replace 
sugar.52  The reliance on a vast array of substitutes characterized le système D, which 
itself characterized life in France under the occupation.  Historians and contemporaries 
alike have seen in this an ingenuity admirable in the French.53 
 Much more serious than a shortage of tobacco or a dearth of available perms was 
the growing scarcity of coal.  The Germans requisitioned a majority of what was 
produced, both for their administration in France and for the needs of the Front.54  Trains 
laden with French coal could be seen crossing the country, bound for Germany and 
Italy.55  This scarcity became particularly pronounced in the unusually hard winters of 
1940-41 and 1941-42.56  Coal became a highly prized commodity in extralegal trading.  
SNCF railway workers, who had privileged access to coal during its transport, were often 
responsible for its availability on the black market.57   
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Transportation was also changed by the war.  Petrol was badly needed, and in 
large quantities, for the German war effort against the Soviet Union.  Henri Drouot 
remarks several times in his journal on the silence reigning over Dijon, once no one could 
drive.58  In addition to the practical shortage of available petrol, the Germans also 
established limits on how many cars were allowed on the roads – in Paris, for example, as 
of 1940 there were only 7000 permits available for private cars.59  Many other cars had 
been requisitioned for the German forces.60  In the absence of automobiles, the French 
turned increasingly to bicycles for transportation – by 1944 there were 2 million bikes in 
Paris.61  Evidence has even been found suggesting a black market specifically for 
bicycles and bicycle parts.62  
Shortages were accompanied by physical and psychological repercussions.  This 
psychological hunger doubled the actual hunger.63  Children growing up during the war 
were markedly shorter than average, due to malnutrition.  Minor infections were rampant 
as people lacked the strength to fight them off.  One author describes malnutrition in 
Paris as leading to skin drying out, cracking and even developing boils due to vitamin 
deficiencies.64  In 1942 the mortality rate in Paris was 42% higher than between 1932-
38.65  These changes could not fail to have a psychological impact and left many citizens 
numb.  It can be argued that it created a preoccupation with day-to-day survival that 
paralyzed, or at least delayed, the development of an effective resistance movement. 
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According to historian Ian Ousby, “In retrospect this would seem, to many of those who 
did manage to survive, the real humiliation of being occupied: they had thought of 
themselves and their stomachs when they should have been thinking of France.”66  This 
statement is supported both by Ousby’s fellow historians who point to a preoccupation 
with finding the next meal as characteristic of the occupation, as well as contemporary 
journals, which all share a remarkable preoccupation with availability and costs of food.67 
 A discussion of food and the changing market dominates both Alfred Fabre-Luce 
and Henri Drouot’s journals.  Fabre-Luce pinpoints the fall of 1940 as the first alarm, 
when unfamiliar foods began entering the market.  Alfalfa, traditionally used as horse 
feed, entered the human diet as well.68  By mid 1941, he likens food to El Dorado: rare 
and highly sought after.69  With his journalist’s eye, Fabre-Luce was able to discern the 
issues of class exposed by shortages.  The first reaction the French have to rationing, he 
notes, was to simply use more capital to obtain what they wanted.  Those with money, 
then, still had access to almost everything, through some means or another.70  He also 
emphasizes the reciprocity that grew from shortages and the black market – those looking 
for tobacco, for example, would bring a chicken with them.  To get something, you first 
had to have something.71 
 The beginning of the occupation in Dijon, writes Drouot, was marked by a supply 
crisis, when peasants refused to send their goods to market at the new German imposed 
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prices.72  Drouot is particularly assiduous in monitoring the market, including a 
discussion of prices, availabilities and rumors.  One such rumor alleged that sending 
potatoes to Paris, presumably in the popular colis familiaux, was illegal and could result 
in a fine of 2000 francs.73  Another rumor, that requisitioned supplies were feeding the 
entire Nazi army, particularly plagued the ravitaillement, to the point that the Germans 
felt compelled to issue several newspaper articles assuring the population of the 
contrary.74  As of October 1940, no lack of food yet beleaguered life in Dijon, but within 
a few short months there was a constant lack of milk and almost no meat.75  On February 
27 Drouot notes that clothing stores throughout the city had closed because they simply 
had nothing left to sell.  The next day he reports that the departments prefects had ordered 
the pâtisseries to close – lavish pastries used valuable supplies of necessities such as flour 
and butter, and were henceforth available only to Germans and select collaborators.76 
 By spring of 1941, Drouot describes a veritable “crise de ravitaillement.”77  A 
kilo of butter had reached 42 francs in Dijon, and by May no eggs, potatoes or butter 
were available at the market.  Drouot provides a good illustration of changes in ration 
portions over time – in April 1941 adults were allotted 50 grams of beef per person over a 
week long period.  By June it had risen to 80 grams a week.78  Rations were in constant 
flux, subject to an economy under siege, and could rise or fall at any time.  Drouot says 
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that it would be an exaggeration to say anyone in Dijon was dying of hunger; rather, he 
notes sardonically, people are hurried to their deaths by it.79 
 City dwellers like Drouot or Fabre-Luce were subjected to endless queuing and 
waiting under the occupation.  Ration card in hand, they could wait for hours on end, for 
only paltry supplies.  Priority cards aggravated this situation, allowing those who 
possessed them to bypass the odious queues, often leaving nothing remaining in their 
wake.80  Professional queuers even developed, allowing those with means the luxury of 
having someone else do their waiting for them.  Besides obtaining goods, queues served 
other important functions.  They provided a social and political forum for those deprived 
of their political power under the occupation government.  Police were well aware of the 
potential of any queue to devolve into a demonstration or riot, in particular when goods 
ran out of stock, as they frequently did.  They also provided a conduit for information and 
misinformation.  The phrase “on dit,” meaning “they say,” acquired a cachet and reflects 
the importance of this means of spreading knowledge, especially as newspapers came 
under the control of the German censors.81  No one was spared rationing, so queues 
brought all facets of urban society into contact and facilitated their trading information 
and rumors in long wait times with little else to do, proving socially useful to a 
disenfranchised population. 
 If price control and rationing had failed, wage control proved much more 
successful.  While prices continued to climb, wages remained stagnant.  Between 1939 
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and 1943, real wages fell by 37%.82  Prices were increasing an average of 17% a year 
next to wages that hadn’t risen since 1940.83  This compounded the sufferings of a 
population already under significant economic stress, at the mercy of widespread 
shortages.  Eventually about 2/3 of the population could not afford to buy the minimum 
ration diet (1400 calories a day) due to a combination of stagnated wages and steadily 
increasing prices.84  Aggravating this, the franc had been substantially devalued under 
German stewardship.  20 million marks were equivalent in value to 400 million francs.85 
Collaboration 
 Under the occupation, French and German industry became intertwined and 
interdependent.  7000 French firms were taking German orders, both civilian and 
military, in 1941.  By 1944 that number had doubled.86  Ironically, it was German 
demand that quite literally resuscitated French industry, giving it a much needed second 
lease on life.  70-90% of orders taken by French firms during the war years came from 
Germany.87  The Renault Company is an excellent example of this new partnership.  
Owned by Frenchman Louis Renault, prior to the war the company had been among the 
leading automobile manufacturers in France.  Louis Renault seems to have understood 
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quickly which way the wind was blowing – in July 1940, within a month of the armistice, 
he had applied for permission to build for the German air force.88 
 Since France was technically neutral, the idea of making war machines to be used 
against France’s former allies was disconcerting.  Provisions were made, therefore, so 
that while French companies produced the bulk of a tank, submarine, or warplane, they 
did not outfit them with any destructive weaponry.89  Obviously this did nothing to alter 
the deadly nature of these products since any missing weapons were simply added later in 
production, nor does it lessen France’s instrumental role in equipping the German war 
machine – by 1944 French factories were producing as many as 800 planes a month.90  
Nevertheless, it is revealing as to a general hesitancy among the French to enable the 
German army, in spite of state endorsed collaboration. 
 Workers employed in factories like Renault present an interesting dilemma in 
terms of collaboration.  It goes without saying that, lacking the cooperation of these 
workers, economic collaboration would have failed.  Factory employees, and indeed, 
even captains of industry like Louis Renault himself, viewed their economic partnership 
with the Germans as circumstantially necessary and politically neutral.91  Particularly in 
the beginning of the war, historian Werner Rings identifies a “general tendency and 
readiness of the inhabitants of occupied territories to compromise with the enemy for as 
long as humanly possible.”92  This did not, however, mean that workers greeted their new 
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partnership with enthusiasm: Rings concludes, “mute detestation and mute collaboration 
were quite compatible” and, indeed, persisted throughout Occupied France.93 
 Economic collaboration is inseparable from the urban experience of occupation.  
French industry was concentrated in the north, which became the Occupied Zone.94  The 
majority of these were concentrated in northern cities – Renault, for example, was in 
Boulogne-Billancourt, a suburb to the west of Paris.  
 The Germans held significant power over French industry.  According to Henri 
Drouot, they had forced 1500 factories to close down by June 1942, particularly in the 
region around Paris (which, as mentioned above, held the greatest concentration of 
industry in France).95  These factories – predominantly paper mills, and ceramic, fabric 
and furniture plants – distracted from the war effort and diverted much needed resources, 
both in raw materials and in manpower. 
 Perhaps the most famous, or rather infamous, examples of collaboration, though, 
were not economic at all.  Rather, they were the relationships that developed between 
German soldiers and French women.  This begs the question: Can such interpersonal 
relationships be interpreted as collaboration?  Whether or not we choose to in hindsight, 
contemporaries certainly answered yes. Women who consorted with Germans met harsh 
reprisals in the wake of Liberation – their heads were shaved as a public reminder of their 
shame, with them as long as it took their hair to grow out.96 
 It is impossible to determine how many French women entered into romantic or 
sexual relationships with German soldiers.  Even at the height of German power, the 
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majority of these relationships were conducted clandestinely. Although relationships 
sprung up in all geographical areas, they were at their most prevalent in urban areas 
where the population of German soldiers were highest.  In 1940, for example, Paris was 
host to some 40,000 Germans, forty percent of the entire German presence.97  Other 
urban centers, though less concentrated than Paris, also had high populations of Germans.  
Urban areas also offered degree of secrecy for the women, as even during the war at the 
height of German power such relations were frowned upon.  The natural anonymity of 
urban life provided an aid.   
 It is revealing to examine the interpersonal relationships between German soldiers 
and French women through an economic lens.  A large majority of women who found 
themselves in compromising positions with occupying soldiers belonged to lower 
economic orders.  It was common for them to work in cafés or hotels frequented by 
Germans, thus putting them in close contact with soldiers and facilitating any 
interactions.  Author Simone de Beauvoir kept a journal documenting her life in 
Occupied Paris.  She recounts seeing a veritable throng of  “tarty” girls gathered around 
Germans in the cafés.98 
Resistance 
Urban centers were the initial birthplace of the resistance, although as the war 
progressed it became an increasingly rural movement.99  Prior to 1942, though, resistance 
within France was primarily northern and urban – centered in cities like Paris or Tours.  
Urban resistance pre-1942 had not yet acquired a large degree of organization and instead 
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was largely limited to isolated incidents.  Cutting cables was a particularly common act 
of sabotage.100  These cables facilitated the smooth functioning of the German military 
machine.  Graffiti was also prevalent – the words “A bas le gouvernement de Vichy” 
appeared as early as 1940 in Dijon, scrawled across a wall near a public square.101  As the 
war progressed “V” for victoire began appearing throughout Dijon, as well as in other 
cities.102  The victory it called for was Allied, not German.  Clearly neither act of 
vandalism was particularly threatening to the German soldiers – communication cables 
were quickly replaced and graffittied phrases posed no real danger – but their importance 
lay in their symbolism.  Both declared that the French, though temporarily beaten, were 
not yet defeated.  Germans met these actions with collective fines and occasionally with 
violent reprisals, yet somehow their symbolic potency was not diminished.103 
Historian Robert Gildea conducted a study of resistance, reprisals, and their 
effects on local populations.  One of his primary case studies took place in Nantes in 
October 1941.  Lieutenant-Colonial Holtz, the Feldkommandant of Nantes and the Loire-
Inferieure, was assassinated.104  Far from the enthusiasm one might expect, the Nantais 
greeted the assassination with horror.  Holtz had been a popular figure, liked and trusted 
by the local populace.  Furthermore, Holtz had been a known entity.  Who would Berlin 
replace him with?  The fear of reprisals was very real and quickly substantiated:  48 
hostages were executed immediately as an incentive for those with information regarding 
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the assassination to come forward.  It was only by the intervention of Otto von 
Stulpnagel, France’s military governor, that 50 additional hostages scheduled to be 
executed were saved.105  Far from rallying Nantes to the cause of Resistance, this event 
repelled the city from it.  Efforts at collaboration were intensified in an attempt to repair 
the damages done by the assassination.106  Following Liberation, General Charles de 
Gaulle delayed visiting Nantes and endorsing its new government until January of 1945, 
months after he had visited neighboring Angers and given them his support.107  He had 
not forgiven the city its behavior after the hostage crisis.  The case of the Nantes 
assassination is extremely important.  It reveals that, in spite of mounting Franco-German 
tensions and the prevalence of symbolic cable cutting and graffiti, resistance was not 
universally popular, even in areas under the full weight of to the occupation. 
Social Conditions 
Anarchy and lack of societal structure facilitated crime during the occupation.  
The lines between police and criminals increasingly blurred in the face of the black 
market.  Frequently, law enforcement turned a blind eye to black market activity, and 
even participated in it.108  As one law enforcement officer put it, “Je fermerai les yeux sur 
vos petits trafics.  En compensation, soyez raisonnables: approvisionne la marche.”109  
Jurisdiction also became increasingly problematic.  Wanting to prove their abilities and 
gain autonomy, French police forces often stepped in: “In the end the French police and 
administration, imagining that they were acting independently, in fact simply did the dirty 
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work of the SS and then found matters taken out of their hands.110  It was French forces, 
not German, who were responsible for rounding up Parisian Jews in July 1942 and 
placing them in the Vélodrome d’Hiver, a bicycling center outside Paris, to await their 
fate in collective misery that a modern observer might compare to the aftermath of 
Hurricane Katrina.111 
Faux policiers, literally meaning fake policemen, capitalized on the prevailing 
atmosphere of chaos.  Impersonating law enforcement, criminals would extort bribes, 
steal and menace the population.  This practice depended on anonymity and could 
flourish in big cities, Paris in particular.  Between 1941 and 1945, over 800 thefts by faux 
policiers were reported in the metropolis.112 
A list of forbidden behavior dominated the lives of France’s urbanites.  Exhibiting 
hostility to Germans was prohibited, as was offering aid to former French soldiers, or to 
anyone attempting to cross into the Free Zone.  Any exposure to foreign propaganda was 
strictly banned, whether via radio (keeping radio transmitters was criminalized) or via 
communication with any country unfriendly to the Reich.  The possession of hidden 
weapons was, understandably, forbidden, but so too were less obvious acts of subversion, 
like taking photographs outdoors, assembling without express permission, or displaying 
flags.113  It is no surprise that the German verboten was quick to enter the French 
lexicon.114 
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 One of the most significant, if also the most obvious, results of living in an urban 
area during the occupation was the physical presence of Germans.  The army took over 
large civilian buildings like schoolhouses and seminaries to create administrative 
centers.115  Many organizations ceased functioning, including the University of Dijon, 
where Drouot himself held a position on the faculté des lettres.116  Their pressure on 
civilians was most severe and most personal when it came to billeting soldiers with 
French families.  This practice drew the attention of many contemporaries including Irene 
Nemirovsky and Jean Bruller, both of whom featured it as a key element in their 
fictionalized versions of occupation.117  Billeting was not as widespread as either novel 
would suggest – neither Drouot nor Fabre-Luce make any mention of it – but their shared 
emphasis on it reflects its intrusiveness.  It confronted French citizens with a daily 
reminder of their dire circumstances. 
 Billeting represented perhaps the most extreme instance of Franco-German 
interactions.  The majority of these interactions, by contrast, took place outside the 
domestic sphere.  Work brought together the largest numbers of French and Germans, 
particularly in construction: the ports and aerodromes built throughout the Occupied 
Zone providing the most notable example of this.118  The French characterize the initial 
German presence as “unnatural.”119  This fits with our modern perspective, which tends 
to squirm at images of Nazis marching down the Champs Elysees, which seem almost 
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sacrilegious in their incongruity.  As the war progressed, though, the German presence 
became habitual, virtually unnoticeable and quite unremarkable in its familiarity.120 
 Jean Guehenno, a renowned French writer of the war period, wrote an essay in 
1943 entitled To the German I Pass in the Street that characterizes the ambivalence with 
which he and his compatriots saw the German presence.  He advises his fellow 
Frenchmen to feign ignorance and blindness around their occupiers, pointedly ignoring 
them.  The object, he says, is to deny them “the warmth of a glance exchanged.”121  He 
does, however, concede the ambiguity of the situation – amongst the Germans, there are 
all kinds of people, he recognizes, just as there are amongst the French.  He notices one 
German soldier in particular, an old man whom he passes virtually everyday, and sees his 
loneliness and humanity.122  Guehenno’s analysis reflects the difficult reality he shared 
with his contemporaries.  On the one hand, the Germans could be dissolute – in one 
instance in Dijon, Drouot describes them peeing on a wall – but the French also 
recognized their occupiers as humans.123  Nonetheless, a silent, tacit agreement existed 
between the French, to behave as if the occupier, and even the war itself, simply did not 
exist.124 
 Electricity failure has been cited as “an unsung story of the German Occupation” 
and was an extremely important aspect of social conditions, particularly in urban areas.125  
The uncertainty of electricity plagued the population and is mentioned by several 
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contemporaries, including Fabre-Luce.  He claims that it would be better to go without 
electricity entirely than wait anxiously for it to run out.  Electricity was not the only 
uncertainty he cited – running water and gas were also only sporadically available.126 
 In fact, the Germans went out of their way to behave among the French.  Though 
attempts to pacify the French populace may certainly have had sinister undertones, they 
nonetheless drastically reduced the harshness of occupation.  Germans specifically 
decided not to treat France like another Poland.127  According to Ousby, “Germans 
viewed France with a respect they did not feel for Poland or Czechoslovakia or 
Yugoslavia.”128  Anticipating the atrocities that had accompanied the First World War, 
French citizens were initially shocked by the German’s behavior.129  The word used most 
often to describe it is “correct” and it appears in multiple sources. Germans soldiers in 
France, in particular before 1942, behaved more like tourists than like a conquering 
army.130  They respected French culture and saw their time their as a veritable culinary 
vacation.  It was a common sight in Dijon to see the resident Germans eating steak in 
restaurants while the majority of the local population went without.131  In Paris 
especially, soldiers on leave from other parts of the Occupied Zone would see the sights 
and spend money freely. 
 Perhaps one of the most striking features of urban occupation though is the 
continuity in city life.  Simone de Beauvoir’s War Journal stands testament to this.  She 
recounts returning to her “usual table” at Le Dôme, where she can see placards 
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advertising that day’s plat du jour.132  Loneliness and hunger were everywhere, but so too 
were sings of life and prosperity.  In fact, some historians have cited the “superficial 
normality of wartime Paris” as one of the greatest shocks of the occupation.133  Unlike 
other occupied territories, France preserved a large degree of autonomy, visible it its 
overall normalness:  “Food was short, to be sure, but something could always be rustled 
up at dinner parties attended by a young aesthete with the right connections.”134 At the 
end of the day, then, Paris was still Paris. 
The enduring, and, indeed, growing, popularity of cinema under the occupation 
attests to this overlay of normality.  Movie going reached new heights of popularity 
during occupation.  Parisian cinemas saw record ticket sales during the war.135  To a 
beleaguered population, movies provided a form of escapism, an alternative to the harsh 
realities of daily life. 
Conclusion 
Yet even given certain continuities or any available escapism, urban life during 
German Occupation was a unique event, almost impossible to capture: “the experience 
was oddly elusive even at the time and almost impossible to reconstruct faithfully in 
retrospect.”136  This makes the work of historians even harder, as we are presented with a 
series of half recollections and pieced together memories.  However, it is possible to 
construct an image of the urban experience of the occupation, given these pieces.  The 
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sources I have chosen to use – primarily the wartime diaries of Alfred Fabre-Luce and 
Henri Drouot, with some additions by French authors like Simone de Beauvoir or Jean 
Guehenno, all supplemented by secondary research and historiography – proved 
particularly rich.  Put together, they present a detailed picture of Occupied France, and 
identify the key concern of contemporary French: their day-to-day existence.  This is 
born out by the frequency with which food availability and market prices are cited – both 
pepper the writings of Fabre-Luce and Drouot, as well as appearing throughout de 
Beauvoir’s journal.  Thus we can conclude that, more than anything, urban occupation 
was characterized by this preoccupation.  Historiography confirms this: one French 
historian writes that “Between 1940 and 1944, the average French citizen spent most of 
his or her time trying to find something to put in the pot for dinner.”137  Perhaps this does 
not present the most honorable or exciting image of cities in wartime France.  But it does 
give us a realistic one.  The image of the majority of French was “a débrouillard, a 
survivor, who was neither heroic nor utterly abject, but adapted to difficult 
circumstances.”138  Urban life in Occupied France was full of uncertainty – how to deal 
with the Germans one was forced to encounter throughout the day; what to do should the 
electricity supply run out, as it almost invariably did; whether or not to take an 
ideological stance, siding with the collaborators or the resistors; how to stretch a 
paycheck in a declining and controlled economy; and, most importantly, how to navigate 
that economy to subsist and live out the war. 
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Ch 2.  Occupation in the Countryside 
 
Introduction 
 
Historiography has tended to deemphasize the effects of the German occupation 
on the French countryside.  While Paris and other cities may have been ravaged by 
hunger, the countryside allegedly emerged unscathed.  Not merely unscathed, in fact, but 
wealthier and more powerful for having living through the war.139  One official in the 
Eure department in Haute-Normandie said in 1942 that “The rural part of the population, 
which scarcity affects little as far as farmers are concerned and which earns more money 
than ever, does not seem unhappy with its fate.”140  Irene Nemirovsky on the other hand, 
a French author whose own experience in l’exode and under Vichy’s anti-Semitic laws 
dictated much of her writing, wrote “In the countryside nothing changed, everyone just 
waited.  They waited for the war to end, for the blockade to be lifted, for the prisoners to 
come home, for the end of winter.”141 
So what then was the experience of the average paysan and small town 
dweller?142  Was the war and subsequent occupation an unlooked for boon for France’s 
ailing countryside?  Did France’s small towns and open country live through the 
occupation with little involvement and less change?  The answer is both, and neither.  
Undeniably, some farmers prospered through the new black market and economic 
system.  Even in polycultural areas, however, hardship was just as common as affluence.  
Playing the role of supplier was a dangerous game and, if detected, ran the risk of severe 
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penalties.143  Small towns and villages faced economic privations and shortages of their 
own.  The new laws of economics came with social changes that ranged from the 
presence (or absence) of German soldiers to complex questions of loyalty and survival. 
The occupation was more than the revenge of the countryside, of les paysans 
triomphant.144  It was a new world to be navigated – a task some took to more than others 
– but changes in the countryside were real and palpable, if also occasionally dulled and 
distant.  The best way to understand the new rhythms of rural life is through the lives of 
those that felt them.  Marie-Louise Osmont kept a diary throughout the war, while living 
in her chateau on the Normandy coast, three miles from Sword Beach, one of the 
eventual landing sites of the Allied forces during the D Day invasions in June 1944.145  
Osmont was a wealthy woman, thanks to her marriage to Dr. Osmont, whom she met 
while volunteering for the Red Cross during the First World War.  The doctor died 
shortly before the outbreak of the Second World War, leaving Marie-Louise isolated in 
Château Périers, the Osmont family seat in Périers, Normandy, a town of some 250 
people.146  By virtue of wealth and geography, Marie Louise Osmont’s wartime 
experience was truly extraordinary, including witnessing first hand the Allied and 
German fighting that followed D Day.  Her diary is rich with everyday information, 
including her interactions with and opinions of German soldiers quartered with her, and 
brief discussions of shortages, market availability, as well as a revealing commentary of 
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social conditions.  She provides a glimpse into France’s social stratification.  Though it 
predates the war by centuries, it persists during the years of occupation and greatly colors 
personal experiences and opinions.  Unwittingly, Osmont offers a window into this world 
and its innate prejudices, both through her own aristocratic distance, and in discussion of 
her domestic servants, who may have lived in the same place as her during the war, but 
whose experiences differed radically. 
 Some 225 kilometers south and west of Périers, depending on the route, lies St. 
Brieuc, Brittany.  Though St. Brieuc was a regionally important market town, its 
population in 1940 was small, roughly 40,000 – it can thus still be counted outside urban 
life and equated with the countryside that surrounded it.147  From 1899 to 1980, it was 
home to Louis Guilloux, a renowned French author.  Between 1921 and 1974, Guilloux 
kept a journal recounting his daily life and experiences called the Carnets.148 Since 
Guilloux was a cultural figure of some repute, his experience may have differed from that 
of his fellow Bretons.  Bearing this in mind, he is still an extremely valuable source.  He 
was an excellent observer and, perhaps significantly, focused not solely on the war or the 
marketplace, but mainly his own personal life, reflecting a persistent normalcy not 
apparent in Osmont’s experiences further down the coast, closer to the war’s immediate 
impact. 
 The two accounts, taken together, present very different pictures of the rural 
civilian’s life under the occupation.  Their distinct focuses and experiences are revealing 
– what begins to emerge are experiences dictated by region.  The resistance movement, 
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temptation to collaborate, requisitioning and black marketeering – these were 
omnipresent and, indeed, virtually inescapable.  But in France’s countryside, it was 
geography that determined their degree. 
Economic Conditions 
The countryside was the most important part of the complex economic web, both 
legal and not, that developed under German occupation.  While cities demanded, the 
countryside supplied.  It was this role that has caused some to see the rise of the 
countryside during the occupation.  Unlike Haussmanian or Third Republic France, 
Vichy favored and actively promoted rural areas, as France’s cultural and moral 
backbone.149  This gave paysans moral high ground (at least theoretically), but control 
over production and distribution gave them real power.  The survival of France’s 
agricultural sector was crucial to France as a whole surviving the war.  However, rural 
France not only produced essential supplies badly needed by their urban counterparts, but 
also added its own strain on these supplies. 
By virtue of the basic nature of economic production, the countryside had a 
natural and complete monopoly in agricultural production.  Over time, this monopoly 
became increasingly problematic.  Mounting difficulties in transportation disrupted 
preexisting trade patterns.  Occasionally this resulted in trade being conducted erratically, 
but it could also cause a trade route to disappear entirely.  The availability of working 
trucks and automobiles was greatly affected by the occupation.150  Petrol was highly 
prized by the German army and requisitioned frequently, as well as occasionally cars 
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themselves.  With the disturbance of trade patterns and ordinary urban-rural exchanges, 
products tended to move less, becoming increasingly fixed to their points of production.  
Regionalism reigned and effected trade patterns just as much as it did mentalities – 
loyalties shrank from nation to region or even town.151  This gave much of the economic 
power, particularly in terms of agriculture, to the countryside.  Especially when France 
faced blockade and trade restrictions, proximity to the source of production became 
crucially important. 
Yet even with proximity, the availability and pricing of different foodstuffs varied 
regionally.  Single crop regions, for example, lacking self-sufficiency, were more 
susceptible to the rise and fall of government-imposed prices and the frequently 
mercenary nature of the black market.152  Multi-crop regions, by nature more easily self-
reliant, were at a comparative advantage.  It was no coincidence that the Germans 
occupied precisely those territories, the north and the west, which were the most fertile 
and the most diverse in their products.153  The Free Zone, southern France, specialized in 
non-essential products such as wine and olives.  Products not immediately available 
could easily become prohibitively expensive in such environments. 
One commonality, which seems to have spanned regions and perhaps even 
bridged some of the gaps in the pervasive localism, was the black market.  While other 
economic sectors faltered or failed entirely, it positively flourished during the occupation.  
For a producer, not participating in the black market would almost invariably result in a 
net loss.  Purchasing a cow, for example, would cost an estimated 9000 francs.  The price 
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fixed for resale by the French authorities was only 7000 francs.154  The initial loss of 
2000 francs is only the beginning, as the cost of keeping and feeding the cow for months 
could be equally excessive.  Piglets, too, lost nearly half their value in the official 
market.155  Government regulated prices could not keep pace with the inflated values of 
goods.  Selling through the marche amical or the black market presented a much more 
profitable option.156 
The best way of doing this was often by selling direct.  If customers came directly 
to a farm, suppliers were able to share the risks of marketeering with their buyers.  It was 
by far the most effective way of circumnavigating the authorities, as colis familiaux could 
easily be confiscated in transit.157  Urbanites throughout France began taking regional 
trains into the countryside to find supplies and prices more favorable than those in the 
cities.  These trains took the names of popular vegetables and became known as trains 
des haricots, trains des pommes de terre, etc.158   
From the suppliers perspective, selling directly and avoiding as much of the 
requisition as possible makes a great deal of sense.  Both Vichy and German authorities 
imposed fixed prices, which were invariably much lower than the market value of any 
given product.  Indeed, the disparity between the black market value of a product and its 
fixed price could, and often did, differ radically. In 1943, for example, the government 
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set cost of a dozen eggs was 24 francs, while on the marche amical the price was 53 
francs, and on the black market it was 76, three times the regulated price.  In the same 
year, the price of rabbit ranged from 26 francs officially, to 39 through the marche amical 
and 52 francs on the black market.159  Through the extralegal channels available through 
the black market and the marche amical, the supplier regained primacy.  The majority of 
risks ran with the supplier, from acquiring a product (in particular if that product passed 
through several hands before reaching its final destination – hence why selling direct was 
so popular) to ensuring that transactions passed unnoticed by authorities.160  When black 
marketeering was discovered, it was met with heavy fines and occasional internment.161 
The French perspective on profiteering was complex and at times contradictory.  
If done in moderation, the French overall approved the process.  From an economic 
standpoint, they recognized its utility and necessity.  Without black marketers willing to 
take large risks to turn a profit, the history of the occupation would be far different, 
marked by a dramatic increase in scarcity and suffering.  Moderation, though, was 
essential.  Anything else was perceived as taking advantage of one’s nation and 
countrymen.  “A distinction was… drawn between those who profited excessively from 
the misery of the compatriots and those who merely tried to make ends meet.”162  “Fair” 
dealings were of a premium importance.  It is an odd twist of fate, and perhaps 
characteristic of the entire occupation, that “By the terrible logic of the Occupation, the 
French who went hungry kept most of their anger for the French who ate well.”163  This 
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notion of wrongly diverted anger runs throughout literature documenting the occupation.  
The suggestion, though it remains largely implicit, is that had that anger been directed at 
the German occupiers as its primary target, France could have presented a stronger 
defensive front. This theory suggests national strength and possibility frustrated by the 
weaker sides of human nature, reveling in shared suffering and ignoring the larger shared 
experience of occupation. 
Occasionally, albeit rarely, tension resulting from the economic disparities and the 
unequal distribution of goods (both real and perceived) erupted into violence.164  This 
occurred most frequently when city dwellers took the train des legumes into rural areas, 
to tap into rumored stores of supplies.  Sometimes farmers refused to trade with these 
foragers, most often because they already had economic relationships in place.  Urbanites 
imagined farmers and their fellow paysans to be in possession of an enormous wealth of 
supplies.165  This perceived prosperity stood in stark contrast to the scarcity that so often 
plagued France’s cities during the occupation and aggravated nerves already strained by 
shortages.   
Violence is a radical, and rare, example of the tension that arose between the city 
and the countryside under the occupation.  More often, it manifested itself in other ways, 
most persistently a simmering overlay of distrust and suspicion that pervaded the entire 
occupation.166  In fact, this mutual suspicion predates World War Two by centuries.  It 
was evident in the Great Fear of 1789, when each side imagined their imminent peril at 
the hands of the other.  It was in place even before this in the eighteenth century, when 
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peasants freshly emigrated into Paris were the first ones that civil authorities turned on in 
times of trouble.167  During the occupation, city dwellers assumed that farmers and 
paysans were hoarding supplies and purposefully keeping them off the market.168  There 
is some truth to this allegation, as farmers held back supplies both for their own use and 
for the extralegal channels available to them through the black market and the marche 
amical.  Not every farmer or producer grew wealthy under the occupation, though.  
While they may have been able to sell goods at unprecedented prices in the black market, 
they were subject to these same prices themselves in the costs of production.  The price 
of maintaining farm equipment hiked with inflation.  Some farmers certainly made their 
fortune on the black market during the war years, but just as many were pressed by the 
same scarcity and uncertainty that plagued French cities.169 
Neither Guilloux nor Osmont provide extensive discussions of economics under 
the occupation in general, or of the black market specifically.  This omission can be 
interpreted in several ways.  First, it is possible that neither of them ranked it as a very 
high priority – at least not enough to write about it.  This in turn would imply that 
supplies were, by and large available, even given the effects of the occupation.  Second, 
they may not have participated in the black market, or at least done so very little, 
although evidence suggests that nearly everyone in France was involved in the black 
market somehow, so this explanation seems unlikely.170  Finally, they could have omitted 
any mention of the black market for the sake of self-preservation.  The black market was, 
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after all, illegal, and writing down one’s purchases and interactions, even in a private 
diary, could prove a dangerous thing. 
Reading Guilloux’s account of the occupation alone, one would be left with the 
impression that there was no black market, let alone a vibrant and flourishing one, 
equally alive in a town like St Brieuc as in a city like Paris.  One oblique reference is 
made in passing, to an acquaintance of Guilloux’s selling beef to German soldiers 
stationed in the town above the market price.171  Guilloux does not explore the issue any 
further than this passing aside, implying distance from the market, possibly resulting 
from his social class and prestige.  Though she too addresses the black market very 
infrequently, Osmont offers a few more mentions.  They amount to almost side 
comments but are tantalizing as to what they reveal.  Osmont alludes several times to the 
fact that her cook at her chateau is a key player in Normandy’s black market.172  His 
activities cross party lines, as most of what he sold – meat, butter, cognac – went to the 
resident German soldiers. 
Osmont and Guilloux provide illustrations of the effects of rationing and the 
practicalities of availability.  This very omission of the subject strongly suggests that both 
Brittany and Normandy were well supplied for the bulk of the war.  Furthermore, it 
causes the infrequent suggestions of hunger or shortages to stand out all the more.  
Osmont’s first reference to experiencing hunger occurs late – not until 1943 – but seems 
to reflect a problem that has been developing for a while.  She describes cooking nettles 
like one would ordinarily cook chopped spinach.  It is not so bad, she said, “but without 
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any fat, it’s certainly not very nourishing!”173  Drinking copious amounts of water 
throughout the day was her preferred method for quieting the grumbling of an underfed 
stomach.174  Nettles as a dietary supplement suggest very dire circumstances indeed.  
Osmont’s later diary entries, however, imply that availabilities changed drastically, and 
her household once more had access to plentiful food.  In February of 1944, for example, 
she describes the kitchen women peeling vegetables for eight hours a day, which seems 
to suggest that available goods had changed considerably since the days of chopped 
nettles.175  Whether the presence of many billeted Germans affected what the Osmont 
household had access to is a matter of speculation, but it almost certainly did.  The 
Germans quartered in the chateau often brought milk and eggs to the cooks, who would 
cook it up for them as a supplement to their rations.176  This implied sharing leads to 
questions regarding whether supplies were held in common by the Germans and the 
Osmont household.  Did Marie-Louise have equal access to extra milk and eggs, in times 
of plenty?  Whatever the case, the notion of abundance is reemphasized in a entry made 
in March of the same year, which describes feeding kitchen scraps to the dogs as “there 
are plenty!”177  Scraps were so plentiful, in fact, that the dogs were gaining weight – 
surely this would not have occurred in a kitchen strapped for resources. 
Food was not the only good subject to the fortunes of war.  Osmont’s car, for 
instance, was requisitioned for use by the German army in April 1944.  Osmont tried to 
prevent them by putting powdered sugar in the gas tank – a rumored quick fix to 
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temporarily disable a car – but the German mechanics managed to thwart her efforts by 
fixing it and taking it anyways.178  
For Louis Guilloux miles away from Osmont in St Brieuc, the situation appears to 
have been quite different.  While he makes clear that shortages were felt, they never seem 
to become as dire as chopped nettles.  His analysis reveals instead lesser versions of the 
same supplies, or perhaps tightening one’s belt a notch or two, but nothing extreme.  
Coffee and tobacco ran short, and Guilloux bemoaned that quality-typing paper was 
virtually impossible to come by.179  When the Pentecost procession passed through the 
streets of St Brieuc in 1941, the habitual candles were absent.  The reason for this, 
Guilloux reported, was twofold – they were forbidden, but impossible to find even if they 
had been allowed.180  He complained early on about the quality of bread available – wet 
bread, he explains, is for dogs, and dry bread is for prisoners.181  Guilloux was neither 
and clearly felt himself to be superior to what the market was supplying.  Wine and wool 
were also missed early in the occupation.182  While neither of these are necessities (at 
least not in the short term), wine in particular was missed in the French culture.  Later on 
in the occupation, though, the situation seems to have righted itself, or perhaps 
normalized due simply to having been in place for so long.  Wine was once again 
obtainable, and, indeed, Guilloux seems to find nothing remarkable in its availability.183  
Even coffee returned – in 1944, Guilloux drank some while eating a sandwich at a café, 
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“comme hier.”184  His treatment indicates that, though shortages may have been felt in St. 
Brieuc, they were neither severe nor long lasting. 
Guilloux refers to several other shortages.  Bicycles, he reports, were 
requisitioned for the German army, although this seems to have occurred late in the 
occupation, May of 1944.185  Coal shortages, unlike other goods, hit the town hard, and 
eventually reached such a dire point that coal shipments simply stopped arriving.186  No 
doubt this material shortage was felt particularly keenly in the wet Breton winters. 
Guilloux records the observations of one of his fellow Bretons in his journal, 
regarding the ravages of the occupation.  “The occupation left terrible memories.  The 
country has been ruined.  An intendant, employed to collect requisitions from the 
recalcitrant, has used the infallible means of lodging garrisons with them, who behaved 
themselves like gangsters.”187  The economic system of rural France was scarred by the 
occupation.  As this quotation suggests, much of that scarring was self-inflicted. 
Collaboration 
 
 Castigation of those with plenty was a very real fear under the occupation.  
Denunciations were widespread and pervasive.  Conducting business with strangers led to 
a greater risk of being denounced, and thus effectively limited black market circles in 
their size.188  But denunciation was more than a fear – it was a weapon.189  It was a 
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weapon, moreover, that was wielded almost exclusively by the French, against the 
French.  “Virtually all the matters that have resulted in French people being condemned 
by German tribunals were brought to their notice through denunciations made by other 
French people.”190  
Hardship bred self-interest, and suspicion and distrust were made manifest 
through personal attacks, often with the intent of settling old scores or profiting off the 
anarchic and distrustful times.  Together, these factors created a culture mired in 
misgiving and doubt.  “J’irai le dire a la Kommandantur” was a common, and feared, 
threat, which translates to a taunt warning that the speaker will report to the local German 
authorities.191  The flood of denunciations received by both French and German 
authorities is a blight on the French citizens who lived through the occupation.  It belies 
the fervent desire after the war to forget the role the French played in their own 
occupation.  Forgetting, though, is all but impossible, especially given the sheer volume 
of accusations made.  They inundated authorities.  In her occupation novel Suite 
Française, one of Irene Nemirovsky’s German officers says, “The first day we 
arrived…there was a package of anonymous letters waiting for us at Headquarters.  
People were accusing one another of spreading English and Gaullist propaganda, of 
hoarding supplies, of being spies.  If we’d taken them all seriously, everyone in the 
region would be in prison.”192  Very few condemnations, however, made anonymously or 
not, led to actual convictions – most “upon investigation, were revealed to have 
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originated in personal jealousies or commercial rivalries and seldom led the police to the 
discovery of serious criminal behavior.”193 
 Denunciations have been attributed primarily to women.194  Given the large 
proportion submitted anonymously, this is difficult to verify, but it does follow the logic 
of life under the occupation.  Women were responsible for providing their families with 
food in ever-shrinking markets.  This bred jealousy over possessions, food in particular.  
Neighborliness could quickly turn to hostility in such a competitive environment.  
Nobody “want[ed] to seem richer than they were; they feared being denounced.  There 
wasn’t a single household that didn’t hide its provisions…housewives closed their 
kitchen door at mealtimes so they wouldn’t be betrayed by the smell of lard sizzling in 
the pot, or the piece of prohibited meat, or the cake made with illegal flour.”195   
Accusations became a tool; a means of correcting grievances that often 
encompassed tensions that existed before the war even began.  This was a tradition long 
before World War Two.  It can be traced back to at least the French Revolution (and 
probably before), specifically the Reign of Terror from 1793-1794, when efforts were 
made to purge royalists and anyone who posed a threat to the floundering Republic.196  
These too had more often been the result of personal vendettas than political realities, and 
in the ensuing one hundred and fifty years, little had changed.  In both instances, délation 
became a form of policing, born of jealousy – stopping one’s neighbors from acquiring 
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what one could not.197  Making a denunciation should not, however, be interpreted as 
necessarily implying agreement with either the Vichy or the Nazi regime.198  It was 
collaboration in a utilitarian sense, rather than an ideological one. 
Horizontal collaboration similarly defied ideological identification, and it 
occurred in the countryside as well as in cities.  Marie-Louise Osmont alludes several 
times to her belief that the women working in the chateau kitchen were untrustworthy and 
indecent.  Though she never makes an explicit accusation, her suspicions are quite 
clear.199  It is apparent to even the most casual reader that the women working in the 
Osmont kitchen were conducting affairs with the German soldiers quartered in the 
chateau and nearby areas.  Osmont’s judgment of them is harsh and unequivocal.  
Furthermore, it is a judgment which seems to have been shared by virtually all of the 
French, regardless of region or social class.  It implies that engaging in such relationships 
is un-French, a betrayal of the entire nation. 
It is interesting, and revealing, to contrast Osmont’s reaction to the physical and 
emotional relationships developing between her kitchen maids and German soldiers, and 
the economic deals and trades taking place between her cook and, in all likelihood, the 
very same German soldiers.  The former are judged severely and with no attempt at 
understanding.  The latter, meanwhile, is thought of only momentarily, and then pushed 
aside as Osmont bows to economic necessity.  This seems indicative of the predominant 
opinion throughout France, both during the occupation and reflecting backwards onto it 
after Liberation.  There is a reluctance to recognize the overriding similarities between 
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horizontal collaboration and close economic relations.  Both grew out of necessity and 
were mutually beneficial relationships.  Both illustrate the complicated and varying 
interactions that took place between occupiers and occupied.  And yet the one has drawn 
much less attention, while the other is virtually equivalent to treason. 
Perhaps the reason for this disparity is the primary importance of sexuality and 
gender relations to any culture.  The experience of ignominious defeat and occupation 
precipitated a crisis in French manhood, a nationwide emasculation.200  This crisis was 
augmented by the gender disparity that persisted throughout the occupation.  Some 
1,400,000 Frenchmen had been taken prisoner in 1940 and were held in Germany 
throughout the war.201  The dearth of young men was then filled by German soldiers.  
These soldiers “eagerly anticipated” dalliances with French women during their time 
there.202  That the Germans essentially replaced Frenchmen as the sexual partners of 
French women must have further unmanned and disgraced the French.  It also became a 
way of casting blame – in France’s catastrophic collapse in 1940, loose morals were 
blamed for the nations inability to defend itself and those women who entered into sexual 
relationships with the Germans made easy scapegoats for Pétainists and Gaullists alike.  
For the majority of the French, sexual complicity simply crossed a line that economic 
collaboration did not – it went further in exposing the weaknesses and inadequacies of the 
national system. 
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Resistance 
 
 By late 1941-1942, resistance became an increasingly rural movement.203  It 
moved away from what were initially isolated acts preformed by individuals in 
predominantly urban settings, and into larger, more organized groups working together, 
and occasionally even with the Resistance forces outside of France, most famously 
Charles de Gaulle, who was based in London with his Free French forces.   
This new means of resisting thrived in rural France, where a tradition of rebellion 
was already in place.  This tradition extended as far back as the Vendee Rebellion during 
the French Revolution, which pit peasants and royalists against republicans.204  
Geography also provided a natural advantage.  Mountainous and forested regions served 
as perfect hideaways for small, guerrilla forces.205  Rebellion could survive much more 
easily in these areas than in open country.  The most famous resistance movement to 
emerge out of rural France in this environment was the maquis.  The word maquis 
literally means scrubland, and the French expression prendre le maquis means to go 
underground.  The maquis, then, was a loosely organized covert organization, functioning 
throughout rural France.  Size and structure, varied regionally, but it did share a few 
commonalities across France.  Everywhere it was composed of locals, people known in 
the areas they operated in.206  The faces of resistors were familiar – men from 
neighboring villages and towns.  They were a guerrilla force, composed of volunteers, led 
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by volunteers  - “the grocer the truck driver, the schoolteacher, the policeman, men from 
this district and from the next, men from the water’s edge and men from the farms lost in 
the plains.”207 
The largest numerical growth in the maquis is traditionally attributed to the 
institution of the STO, or Service du Travail Obligatoire, which drafted the French into 
forced labor in Germany.  Instituted in February of 1943, this policy has been identified 
as a, if not the, chief cause in alienating French citizens from the Vichy government and 
pushing them towards the Resistance.208  Initially, only men between ages 20-22 were 
eligible, with exemptions for farmers, miners, students and several other groups.  Within 
a year, eligibility had been expanded to men and women ages 18-45.209  Without 
question, the STO was an extremely unpopular policy, and, more than any other single 
act, left French citizens feeling disenchanted with and, more importantly, betrayed by 
their government.210  Whether it in fact swelled the ranks of the maquis as has been 
believed is a different question.  One could easily be opposed to the German presence and 
Vichy’s policies without joining the active resistance.  There were a large number of 
young men who became STO dodgers, going underground to avoid being sent to forced 
labor in the Third Reich.  Forged certificates of exemption and simply not showing up to 
answer calls were very popular.211  Even Louis Guilloux drops a hint that may allude to 
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his own son dodging the STO.212  It has been widely assumed that all of these men filled 
the ranks of the maquis, and, indeed, many of them probably did.  However, the maquis 
numbers never seem to have reached such levels, and therefore many STO dodgers 
remain unaccounted for.213  Especially on farms and in isolated rural areas, many dodgers 
simply disappeared, going underground and reemerging at the Liberation. 
One of the biggest problems facing any concentrated resistance was the inevitable 
reprisals their actions incurred.  Given the secretive nature of the maquis and other 
resistance groups, it was impossible for the German authorities to target only active 
resistors in their responses, which therefore fell onto entire communities.  The most 
popular form of reprisals was collective fines, levied against entire towns or villages.  
This happened in St. Brieuc in 1943, when two German soldiers were wounded while on 
duty in the town.214  The entire community was fined 2 million francs, to be paid within 
five days.  On good behavior, they would be reimbursed, but if not the money would be 
kept.  These sanctions were intentionally designed to be debilitating and to turn 
populations against the resistance, without resorting to mass executions or deportations.   
Over time, however, this policy changed.  Through 1941 and into early 1942, 
reprisals fell most heavily on French Jews and communists.215  Mass deportations of 
these isolated groups allowed German authorities to respond to resistors without 
jeopardizing collaboration.216  Germans stationed in France saw the necessity of avoiding 
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“Polish methods” in France, but those in Berlin did not always agree.217  As the war 
progressed, deportations began to give way to executions.  In early 1944 new instructions 
were issued for a system of calibrated response, placing a premium on rapid, decisive 
actions and justifying any harm to civilians as “entirely the fault of the terrorists.”218 
This was the policy followed in the small town of Ascq in the Nord on April 1, 
1944.  A train carrying Germany’s SS Panzer Division Hitlerjugend towards the 
Normandy coast was hit by explosives just outside the train station.219  No troops were 
hurt but the rail line was broken, leaving the division vulnerable to any Allied aerial 
attacks.  Immediately action was taken – men were shot at the rail line itself and some 
were taken from their homes and killed – eighty-six total.220  Collective punitive violence 
reached its most deadly point on June 10, 1944, in the small town of Oradour-sur-Glane 
in the Limousin, about forty miles outsides the regional capital, Limoges.  Acting on 
reports that resistance forces were operating in the area, a German battalion massacred 
over 600 civilians living in the town and outlying farmlands.  The level of violence in 
Oradour can be partially explained by events elsewhere.  Four days earlier, Allied troops 
had landed in Normandy and the Germans were facing a bitter fight to maintain their hold 
on France.  As their position became more precarious, a cycle beginning as early as 1942, 
reprisals became more and more severe. 
Even the threat of violent punishment was not enough to deter some dedicated 
resistors.  The village of Le Chambon-sur-Lignon, a small town in the Auvergne, became 
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a haven for refugees during the occupation.  Le Chambon was primarily Hugeunot, and 
thus had a heritage of resisting government edicts stretching back to the sixteenth century 
French Wars of Religion.221  André Trocme, the village’s pastor, spearheaded what 
became a community wide effort to help Jews and other refugees cross the French border 
into nearby neutral Switzerland.222  Needless to say, this put the village, and Trocme in 
particular, at great risk as Vichy and German authorities could not fail to notice 
something suspicious was happening in this tiny enclave of south-central France.  The 
story of Le Chambon provides a glimpse into the many different forms resistance could 
take.  Some people housed refugees permanently, others gave them temporary shelter.  
Fake identity and ration cards were manufactured, food – already scarce – was found for 
each refugee.  Some people even took on the daunting task of leading the refugees over 
the mountains into Switzerland.223  Everyone in the village played a part. 
One of the most intriguing questions raised by the heroism of Le Chambon is why 
there?  Why is it only in this small village that resistance on such a massive, organized 
scale occurred?  Throughout France, both the Occupied and Free Zones, individuals and 
groups aided their fellow French citizens – some people hid Jews in their homes, others 
provided much needed food supplies to city folk cut off from normal trade routes.  
Nothing ever reached the same magnitude as Le Chambon, though.  The reasons for this 
are unclear and, probably, unknowable. 
Social Conditions 
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 In May and June 1940, refugees flooded the west and south as they fled from the 
approaching German army.  Guilloux watched them come in droves to St. Brieuc, from 
Rouen, Paris and Ile de France.224  They came by train, by car, and even by foot.  St. 
Brieuc was by no means alone in receiving droves of refugees during the initial German 
onslaught of 1940.  They poured into the south and west of France from the north and the 
east, pushing towards an unknown destination, and trying desperately to stay ahead of the 
German armies.  Approximately 1/6 of the population of France took to the road.225  
L’exode presented a particular dilemma for farmers, faced with an advancing enemy 
during the height of the agricultural season.226  In retrospect, the chaos of l’exode seems 
futile because it was temporary.  The Franco-German armistice reached on June 22 
installed and entrenched German soldiers in France indefinitely. 
 This brought German soldiers into direct contact with citizens across France, in 
both urban and rural settings.  Marie-Louise Osmont had a significant amount of 
interaction with German soldiers.  Her chateau in Périers, standing close to the 
strategically essential English Channel, was chosen to quarter large numbers of German 
soldiers, the earliest group of which consisted of 2 NCOs and 4 enlisted men and arrived 
in August 1940.227  Osmont refused to leave Château Périers, and was thus subjected to 
what she describes as the continual heartbreak of seeing her beautiful home used to house 
“Franzes.”228  Despite conceding that most of the soldiers were clean and discreet (to the 
point that they became simply part of the background to her), Osmont still found their 
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presence unbearable.229  But as each battalion of German troops moves on, she found 
herself wishing they would stay.  This suggests that familiarity bred comfort, rather than 
a genuine attachment or trust.  Over the weeks, and occasionally months, spent billeted 
together, Osmont and her household came to know the Germans they were living with, 
but new groups of soldiers represented a renewed threat – who could tell what each new 
group might bring.230  This comfort in familiarity is reiterated throughout literature 
regarding the relationships between occupiers and occupied.231  The familiar predictable 
enemy was far safer than the unknown, untested one. 
 Due to its tactical location, billeting was very popular in Périers – in May 1944, 
there were 220 Germans quartered in the small town, a number almost equal to the 
population of the town itself.232  St. Brieuc, by contrast, had far fewer German soldiers. In 
January 1941 Guilloux was visited at home by two German officers who had come there 
for lodging.  They left, indicating that they would return shortly for an extended stay, but 
seem to have never returned.233  Thus Guilloux was spared the unenviable task preformed 
by Osmont of quartering enemy soldiers – he never again mentions it as a possibility.  
This disparity was due to geography – the Normandy coast was a far more likely landing 
point than Brittany. 
 Guilloux describes one tense interaction with a German soldier, which stands out 
against the staid nature of most of his diary entries.234  One day, in March of 1943, he 
was walking down Rue Victor Hugo in St. Brieuc with his friend Elie.  The two of them 
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were walking and talking amongst themselves, when a German officer approached, 
walking the opposite direction down the street.  The two friends continued to walk, 
oblivious to the fact that the German officer had signaled them to get out of his way, until 
they were nearly on top of each other.  Guilloux quickly stepped aside, but Elie was 
slower and the German officer roughly elbowed his aside.  Indignant, the two parties 
exchanged hostile words and gestures for several minutes before eventually wandering 
off to nurse their wounded pride, when they failed to make themselves understood. 
 Especially in the vulnerable coastal regions of France, frequent bombs dropped by 
Allied forces seem to have been accepted with little complaint as a fact of life.  Guilloux 
mentioned them constantly, but rarely with any sense of fear or hostility.235  It would 
seem easy for Guilloux to turn against the Allies after experiencing repeated 
bombardments, but he merely reports them, never commenting, suggesting Allied 
sympathies.  Evidence suggests that this sentiment was widely shared throughout France 
– the English and Americans were largely absolved of any civilian casualties their 
preparatory strikes had.  After one 1943 aerial attack in the Loire had damaged a 
locomotive parts factory, the workers “anger was aimed at the management for not 
providing enough air raid shelters rather than against the British, whose skill in targeting 
all twenty-four of their bombs on the factory itself they rather admired.”236  Indeed, it is 
only natural that, following their own subjugation, the French should turn to the English, 
their nearest ally, for salvation.  As the war progressed and an Allied victory looked 
increasingly probable, this feeling only increased. 
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 Radio united the people of France during the war, and city or country, provided 
them with news of the outside world and the progress of the war.  German authorities 
foisted Philippe Henriot on the Vichy government, as their chief radio personality for 
Radio Paris.  Until his assassination in 1944, Henriot was one of the most vocal 
proponents of collaboration available to Vichy.237  Radio Paris, though, took a backseat to 
BBC, the British Broadcasting Company, which, by 1942, was probably the single 
greatest unifying institution in France.238  Through BBC, no matter where one lived, war 
news was available without the filter of German or Vichy propaganda so prevalent on 
Radio Paris and other collaborationist airwaves. 
 There is an overall sense of normalcy that persists in literature regarding the rural 
occupation.  This is primarily the result of distance.  Between the armistice in June 1940 
and D-Day in June 1944, there were no battles in France’s countryside and large 
administrative bodies were in the cities, primarily Paris.  In many ways, the war was far 
away.  Much of Louis Guilloux’s time was spent visiting his elderly mother in nearby St. 
Laurent.  He often bicycled there and back, occasionally bringing her butter or other 
goods.239  He went to see the doctor for regular check ups, and even traveled to Paris and 
Burgundy.240  Osmont, meanwhile, seems to have faced much harder times.  All the 
furniture had been removed from her chateau to maximize space for quartering 
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soldiers.241  By 1944, the tires on her bike were completely worn away through overuse, 
and there was nothing on the official market to replace them.242 
 Geography was a telling feature in determining one’s experience of the war.  
Osmont’s tire treads were worn away and unusable, while Guilloux’s managed to take 
him back and forth, from St Laurent to St Brieuc, some 48 km each way.  In both 
Normandy and Brittany, though, their proximity to a possible Allied naval threat was felt.  
Radios were confiscated and deposited en masse at each mairie.243  Tree trunks were 
requisitioned to be used as part of the growing coastal defenses.244  As in France’s cities, 
electricity became sporadic as the war dragged on, particularly in 1943 and 1944.  By 
May of 1944, immediately prior to the D-Day invasions, Osmont reported that electricity 
had gone from sporadic to nonexistent.245  Further west, Guilloux and his fellow Bretons 
were subject to nightly blackouts and the omnipresent threat of complete electricity 
failure.  Typically French, Guilloux felt this hardest at boulangeries, which he says were 
particularly pinched by these new restrictions.246  Presumably, he was referring to the fact 
that most of the baking for the day is typically done the night before, a practice that had 
to be modified without nighttime power sources for the ovens. 
 Gas and water had also run out in Périers by May 1944.247  Though Marie Louise 
Osmont lived through most of the occupation in relative ease, her comfort plummeted in 
the months prior to D-Day, as the resident German battalions anxiously anticipated an 
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Allied landing.  Once again, geography was the determinant here.  While Périers and 
other Norman towns went completely without water or gas, St Brieuc fared much better.  
The mairie issued a decree reducing water consumption.248  Reduction, however, is quite 
different form a total unavailability.  Guilloux daily expected the city’s gas to run out, but 
it never did.249  Though St. Brieuc and other such towns and villages in France’s west 
were unquestionably subjected to hardship and deprivations, their distance from any 
probable Channel crossings granted them a degree of protection unavailable to those in 
more strategically important areas.  The Norman coast, with its small town of Périers, is a 
prime example of this. 
 Geography played an enormous role in the civilian experience of the occupation, 
but it was not the only determining factor.  Social class also seems to have greatly 
affected understandings.  Guilloux and Osmont are both excellent examples of this. 
Guilloux, by 1940, was already a renowned writer, which afforded him the lifestyle of a 
man of leisure.  Several times throughout the war he reports not working very much, and 
his concern regarding his artistic productivity.250  Never, though, does this lack of 
inspiration cause him to have any kind of economic concerns, even in the inflated 
markets of occupied France.  Osmont, with her family chateau and domestic servants, 
was essentially mid-twentieth century country gentility.  Her position afforded her the 
respectful treatment of the German soldiers who lodged with her, and may well account 
for her overall favorable reports of them.  It allowed her to maintain a distance from 
them, and from the lower classes who found themselves more often thrust into German 
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company.  Here we have an excellent explanation of Guilloux’s position in judging her 
kitchen women sleeping with German soldiers – she simply could not relate their 
position. 
 Social class also goes a long way towards explaining why neither Guilloux nor 
Osmont make any lengthy mention of the black market.  Perhaps by virtue of their wealth 
they did not need to touch it.  Or, more likely, they had subordinates to do such dirty 
work for them – it is no great leap of logic to assume that Osmont’s cook, a known black 
marketeer, used these connections to supply the kitchen of Château Périers. 
Conclusion 
 The experience of rural occupation was far more varied than that in urban centers.  
The two greatest determining factors were social class and geography.  Geography 
determined the presence or lack of German soldiers, and in those towns and villages 
where they were present it determined their numbers.  Geography also played a 
significant role in the ability of the countryside to rise and prosper, or to suffer the same 
deprivations occurring in the cities.  Fertile soil with diverse agricultural traditions 
already in place usually meant relatively light shortages, whereas cultivating a specific 
crop, the best example being wine, could often guarantee that the countryside suffered 
even more than some cities, where trade routes were more firmly established.  It also 
introduced certain farmers and producers into the black market, which could lead to great 
wealth on some occasions, and restricted others from it. 
 Social class also played a large role, although a less decisive one than geography.  
It dictated how Frenchmen interacted with the occupying powers.  Respect was often 
reserved for those of higher class.  This is especially true in the case of women, as seen 
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through the diary of Marie-Louise Osmont, who herself was treated with a distant respect 
by the German soldiers she encountered, while her lower class kitchen women were more 
often their sexual play things.  Social class also determined how individuals engaged, or 
did not, with the black market.  Osmont illustrates this as well.  Rank and prosperity 
brought greater access and the means to procure goods even in times of rampant scarcity. 
 Thus the experience of the average paysan or town dweller is difficult to 
determine, as it first demands that we determine what constituted average.  Rural 
occupation changed considerably over time and place and thus is much more difficult to 
grasp than the occupation in the cities.  Variables caused significant differences that make 
an average experience almost impossible to obtain. 
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Ch 3. Synthesis 
Introduction 
 In the previous two chapters, rural and urban occupation have been treated as 
largely separate entities.  They were not.  At every point during occupation, France’s 
cities and countryside formed a web of mutual dependence and occasionally mutual 
enmity.  The purpose of this chapter is to illustrate the links between the two.  In doing 
so, common threads running through the last two chapters that defined both rural and 
urban occupation have been reexamined.  These include collaboration and resistance, 
social class, city and country tensions, and the controlled economy.  A section discussing 
historiography has also been included to demonstrate where such an analysis fits in the 
larger context of studies of the French occupation. 
 Though there would seem to be some redundancy inherent in this approach, the 
intent is not to repeat those points already made, but to expand on them and place them in 
a larger context by connecting the experiences of urban and rural occupation.  In so 
doing, the links between the two experiences can be explored and expanded.  The 
controlled economy and resultant black markets, for instance, are shown to be the most 
vital, and most contentious, link between city and country.  They simultaneously kept 
both groups alive while antagonizing the one against the other.  This issue then leads to a 
discussion of tensions between the cities and the countryside. 
 Tensions between the city and the country derived not only from contemporary 
struggles, but also from historical precedent.  A close examination shows them to have 
pre-dated the French Revolution and probably long before.  This longterm perspective 
aids significantly in tracing the development of this friction as the occupation wore on.  
67 
Viewing the occupation not only in terms of concurrent political and, more importantly, 
material circumstances, but also within a larger historical pattern clarifies the quickness 
and ease with which such tensions were exacerbated under the occupation. 
 These conflicts can be related to the issue of social class in the occupation.  Some 
historians have argued for its inversion under the new rules of occupation, with 
respectable, educated people losing out to opportunists.251  Additionally, those well 
placed within the lines of production and supply, for instance grocers, butchers or 
farmers, had premium access to supplies.  Nevertheless, the bulk of historiography bears 
out that social class was one of the constants to have survived the occupation largely 
untouched.  Wealth remained of paramount importance, and even became increasingly so 
as scarcity spread. 
 The interconnected factors that defined the occupation served to illustrate the 
links between the urban and rural experiences.  Whether these bonds created dependence 
between to two or aggravated it varied with both time and place, which determined the 
degree to which each factor was present. 
Historiography 
 Most of the historiography concerning life in France between 1940-1944 tends to 
focus on one of three things: the Vichy government, collaboration, and resistance.  Until 
quite recently, the late 1990’s and 2000’s, very little attention was paid to the life of the 
average civilian.  A cursory acknowledgement was deemed sufficient, recognizing that 
most French citizens lived out the occupation under relatively normal, if strained, 
conditions, before delving into the underhanded dealings at Vichy or the romantic 
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heroism of the resistance.  On the one hand, this makes sense.  The day-to-day concerns 
of civilian life can seem dull next to freedom struggles or illicit Franco-German 
partnerships.  But this focus ignores the lives of virtually all the French living under 
German occupation and obscures the picture that emerges.  Most Frenchmen were neither 
collaborators nor resistors, and even fewer were directly involved in the Vichy 
government.  Rather, their lives were plagued by economic hardship and the forced 
adjustment to new social realities. 
 Marshall Philippe Pétain’s government in Vichy France has been extensively and 
exhaustively studied.  Straddling the line between neutral state and German puppet, it has 
been the subject of endless curiosity as political historians have attempted to define its 
role, in particular to what degree Vichy was its own master.  Its policies and its 
personalities have been combed through for any signs of complicity or foot-dragging that 
would indicate submission or sovereignty.  The best example of this kind of study is 
historian Robert O. Paxton’s seminal work Vichy France: Old Guard and New Order 
published in 1972.252  Paxton examines Vichy from every angle, including an analysis of 
its myriad influences.  He looks into the French politics of the 1930’s for explanations as 
to Vichy’s conservative leanings and its political and ideological background.  In addition 
to examining its policies, Paxton also delves extensively into the unlikely mixture of 
personalities who descended on the Auvergnat spa town.  While a variety of other works 
have attempted the same approach, Paxton remains the benchmark for historians of 
France under German occupation. 
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 By far the most dominant feature of the prevailing historiography, though, is not 
Vichy and its policies and players, but rather a pendulum swing between two visions of 
Occupied France: the nation of collaborators and the nation of resistors.253  Historian 
Henry Rousso’s influential work The Vichy Syndrome traces and explains the shifts in 
attitudes towards the occupation between 1944 and the present.254  His study traces 
historiography as it has affected and been affected by these shifts.  According to Rousso’s 
classification, postwar memory of Vichy can be divided into three parts.  From 1944-
1954, there were the immediate after effects, what he refers to as the mourning phase.255  
The war was still roughly contemporary, and its direct impacts still reverberated – the 
economy had not yet rebounded and France’s Fourth Republic was floundering.  The 
second phase began in 1954 and lasted until 1971, during which what Rousso terms 
“resistancialism” took hold.256  In this period historians focused on the nation of resistors, 
giving rise to the Gaullist myth and the romantic image of a nation of resistors.  Rousso’s 
classification is too restrictive and ignores the fact that the focus on resistance predates 
1954 and, indeed, even predates the end of the war.  At the Liberation of Paris on August 
25, 1944, a self-congratulatory General Charles de Gaulle shared his feelings with the 
people of Paris, saying that France had “liberated itself.”257  Clearly the story of French 
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Resistance was already being propagated.  In the immediate aftermath of the war its myth 
was already being celebrated.258 
 In fact, resistance was never universal and the contention that France was 
responsible for its own liberation is a dubious one.  Only a small percentage of the adult 
population ever actively participated in the resistance.  In light of the national tragedy 
they had suffered through defeat and occupation, though, the French clung fiercely to the 
idea of a nationwide, collective resistance.  It provided a support system, an emotional 
buffer against the prospect of contemplating what was, in truth, closer to national tragedy 
than glory.  It became a “quasi-sacred symbol” of eternal France.259 
 By 1971 though, the notion of pure republican resistance had run its course – the 
pendulum swung the other way.260  Rousso refers to this as “the return of the 
repressed.”261 As if to apologize for overemphasizing resistance and the glories of France, 
the focus now shifted to her faults.  The nation of resistors became the nation of 
collaborators.  Suppressed memories like the complicity of the Vichy government in the 
deportation of France’s Jews and the eager aid of leading industrialists came flooding 
back.  France was now thought guilty of creating her own misery, the counter myth to the 
glories of the resistancialism. 
 Two things in particular can be pointed to as the cause for this change.  The first 
was 1968.262  1968 in France was a tumultuous year of student rallies and protests.  A 
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new generation of French citizens rose up against “a certain type of society and therefore, 
implicitly, [against] a certain vision of its history.”263  Charles de Gaulle was forced out 
of public life and the entire face of France changed in the wake of this new, liberal 
challenge.  The second change to be born out of 1968 was a more direct attack on 
France’s wartime past.  In 1972 director Marcel Ophuls released the film The Sorrow and 
the Pity, a documentary look at daily life in the southern city of Clermont-Ferrand, 
ostensibly a city representative of the occupation throughout France.264  The film was a 
departure from the norm – de Gaulle was notably absent, with the emphasis instead on a 
wide variety of ordinary people, all with different ideologies resulting in different choices 
during the war.  Ophul’s vision of the occupation was much darker and more nuanced 
than his predecessors, arguing that no one escaped the occupation with their innocence 
intact.  This vision set the tone for the new emphasis on collaboration. 
 True collaboration, like resistance, was a rare phenomenon.  The France of the 
early 1970s’ was in turmoil, plagued by colonial crises and facing the loss of de Gaulle, 
who had been the foremost promoter of resistancialism since its inception.  The shift 
towards emphasizing collaboration reflects these issues and is comparable to the idea of 
self-flagellation – the bad and cowardly French had been the national undoing and 
therefore the contemporary French should pay. 
 Several works written between the 1970’s and early 1990’s attempted to bridge 
the gap, discussing collaboration and resistance in conjunction.  This was a major 
historiographical shift, as it recognized that the two could exist side by side and indeed, 
even influenced one another a great deal.  Werner Rings Life With the Enemy provides an 
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analysis of the interplay between collaboration and resistance not only in France but 
throughout Occupied Europe.265  H.R. Kedward was the author of several works during 
this period, some of which treat the two paths as interrelated, and some in isolation.266 
 At its most extreme, the nation of resistors/nation of collaborators dichotomy is 
believed to have erupted into a guerre franco-française, simmering low-level social strife 
that in 1944 became a veritable civil war.267  This is a serious contention and worth 
exploration.  It is clear that the tumultuous months before and after Liberation in 1944 
saw a not insignificant amount of violence.  This was concentrated between French 
resistance forces and ideological collaborators, in particular the Milice, a paramilitary 
force doggedly faithful to Vichy, and often to the Nazis as well.  Indisputably, 1944 was 
the most dangerous period during the war to be in France.268  However the infrequency 
and limited documentation of violence suggests sporadic anarchy and isolated violence 
between ideological extremists on both sides rather than civil war.  Civilian involvement 
outside these guerrilla bands was very limited.  Given the small number of both 
collaborators and resistors and the general exhaustion with the war by 1944, anything 
approaching a civil war would have been extremely unlikely.  Additionally, it would have 
warranted greater documentation, whereas the festering tension between the Milice and 
the resistors passed largely under the radar. 
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 Neither resistance nor collaboration was ever widespread enough to define the 
experience of all of France, and yet each in turn has been treated as such.  In recent years, 
interest has grown concerning the experience of ordinary civilians.  To that end, regional 
studies have emerged, detailing life in diverse areas of France.  In 2003 English historian 
Robert Gildea published Marianne in Chains, a study of the civilian experience in what 
he terms France’s heartland, the Loire.269  He focuses on several different aspects of 
occupation – the role of the Catholic Church, the relationship between maquis groups and 
the local communities – all through the prism of civilians living in the Loire region.  He 
mixes facts with individual stories to illustrate and prove his larger points.  He argues for 
the continuing divisive nature of differing interpretations of the occupation.  These 
interpretations, which might result in mere disagreements, he claims, have such a divisive 
force because of the vested interests caught up in them, particularly by those looking to 
protect their own or their families past.270 
 Shannon Fogg published a similar work in 2009, entitled The Politics of Everyday 
Life in Vichy France.271  Fogg focuses on the Limousin, a region she says she chose for 
its ordinariness – with a few remarkable exceptions, it provides an excellent case study of 
Occupied France, particularly in terms of the social tensions between town and country 
wrought by food shortages.272 Like Gildea, she mixes facts with stories, allowing 
characters and their contexts to come to life.  Her primary concern in the book is “placing 
political events within the context of the material situation rather than vice versa [to] 
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highlight the way in which the public’s habituation to illegality in daily life eroded the 
Vichy government’s authority and legitimacy over an extended period of time.”273  
According to her analysis, the politics of occupation followed logically from the material 
circumstances thrust upon France’s citizens. 
 These emerging regional studies have been accompanied by several works 
providing a more general examination of the civilian’s lot in all of Occupied France.  The 
best examples of this are written by Richard Vinen, Ian Ousby, and Philippe Burrin.  
Richard Vinen is an English historian teaching at the University of London, who in 2006 
published The Unfree French: Life Under the Occupation.274  Vinen’s discussion of the 
civilian is extremely informative and seems to offer something about every aspect of the 
occupation.  The particular focus, though, is civilian interaction with the occupying 
power.  Civilians are divided into several subcategories to provide the most 
comprehensive picture: Jews, women, POWs, youths, and marketers, to name only the 
most prominent.  The picture that comes out is stark, but not totally so – Vinen allows for 
the complexity and disparity that ultimately characterized the occupation, arguing that the 
relationship between occupier and occupied was constantly in flux and greatly variable. 
 In 1998 Ian Ousby published Occupation: The Ordeal of France 1940-1944.275  
With a cover image that superimposes a swastika over the Eiffel Tower, Ousby goes for 
shock and achieves much of his purpose.  He seems primarily concerned with showing 
the darkness inherent in occupation – where other authors remain vague he is explicit, 
once referring to “respectable folks…braining the pigeons in the public parks” of Paris in 
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their hunger.276  He presents the occupation as it developed chronologically.  By dividing 
it into three sections, Ousby is then able to analyze its progression.  His writing is 
especially memorable, as it is peppered with obscure and surprising facts that serve to 
color and bring to life France in the early 1940’s, from the braining of pigeons to the 
“anti-Semitic diatribes” of Coco Chanel.277  One of the primary distinctions between 
Ousby and other scholars, though, is his condemnatory tone – though he respects the 
adaptability of the French evident in le système D, a certain disdain for their eagerness to 
simply live through the occupation with little thought to outside events provides an 
undercurrent to the book. 
 Philippe Burrin is one of the few French historians to have emerged in recent 
years, as interest has turned towards civilians.  His 1996 work France Under the 
Germans: Collaboration and Compromise was one of the first to offer a national 
perspective on civilians.278  Unlike Ousby and Vinen, though, Burrin is more interested in 
special groups of the population, often unrepresentative of the civilian experience as a 
whole.  This includes discussions of captains of industry, intellectuals, artists, ad-hoc 
militias, and the Catholic Church.  He also devotes a very large section to the role of the 
Vichy government in shaping the occupation as experienced by its citizens.  His states 
goal in writing is to provide context and origins for the most commonly held attitude 
during the war – that of simply trying to get through.279 
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  Several studies have focused on the occupation in Paris alone.  This is perhaps the 
most interesting, if least representative, kind of study.  Paris, though certainly its cultural 
center and heart, is anything but typical of France.  Many of these works look specifically 
at the arts and popular culture as they were affected by occupation – for example Ian 
Buruma’s Occupied Paris: The Sweet and The Cruel and Frederic Spotts The Shameful 
Peace: How French Artists and Intellectuals Survived the Nazi Occupation.280  Both of 
these works focus specifically on the artists and intelligentsia of Paris as they adapted and 
occasionally collaborated their way through the war.  Buruma’s work also looks at 
Parisian culture as a whole, documenting the strange element of normalcy that came from 
the mixture of scarcity and luxury that characterized Occupied Paris. 
 Jean Dutourd’s Au Bon Beurre provides a very different picture of Paris.281  A 
novel published shortly after the war, Au Bon Beurre details the meteoric rise of a family 
owning a Parisian creamery, as they successfully negotiate the black market.  Dutourd’s 
work is an indictment of profiteering hidden in a work of fiction that accurately reflects 
the social stratification of wartime Paris.  The potential pitfalls of any of these works, 
however, is to view Paris or Parisian life as typical of that elsewhere in France, when in 
fact its unique position afforded it an entirely unique experience. 
 All historiography of the French occupation and any discussions thereof are 
inevitably colored by the subject’s sensitivity.  Gildea attributes this to a national inability 
to confront the recent past, saying “the French have never faced up to their wartime past 
in any sustained and systematic way.  Much is at stake ideologically and politically in the 
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interpretation of the Occupation period, and the rival views are propagated and 
defended.”282  Coming to terms with four years of foreign occupation has proven difficult 
for the nation responsible for articulating and subsequently defending the Rights of Man. 
The role of the French in the years of occupation could have ramifications for France’s 
history and contemporary society. 
Controlled Economy 
 An important aspect of the German occupation of France was the controlled 
economy.   Evidence affirming its importance emerges from sources in the city and 
countryside alike and it appears to have been the defining feature most responsible for 
linking the two.  It was first introduced almost immediately after the armistice in June 
1940 as a means of harnessing France’s economy to aid the German war machine.  
Superfluous businesses and factories were closed down, the better to direct energies 
towards those industries which could further the war aims.  Rubber production at the 
Michelin Company outside of Clermont-Ferrand, for example, was maximized, 
facilitating the constant supplies needed for tires and tank treads.283  By late June 1942 
some 1500 factories had been closed in the Occupied Zone, deemed nonessential and 
therefore distracting to the war effort.284  A large number of these manufactured 
household goods – ceramics, furniture and the like, none of it particularly helpful to the 
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Third Reich.  Instead airplane construction became one of the foremost leaders of French 
industry, as production multiplied by almost thirty between 1938 and 1944.285 
 In an ironic twist, this constrained and controlled market resuscitated France’s 
failing economy and poured much needed funds back into production.  The worldwide 
Depression of the 1930’s had hit France later and slower than other countries, but its 
effects were no less palpable – one historian describes it as a “slow paralysis” striking the 
nation.286  This virtual stagnation lasted throughout the tumultuous 1930’s.  During the 
invasion of May and June 1940, though, what reparations had been made were devastated 
by the accompanying anarchy and chaos that plagued the nation, down to its economic 
functions, in the absence of a decisive governing body. German orders and demands 
allowed France’s agricultural and industrial markets to revivify.287  One particularly good 
indication of this change are the labor patterns within France.  At the outset of the war 
and in its early years, unemployment was common and even termed “vast” by one 
historian.288  Those most susceptible were those working in superfluous industries shut 
down or limited by the authorities, as well as people already marginal to society, 
particularly women, foreigners, and Jews.  By 1942, unemployment eased, and by 1944 
there was a veritable labor shortage.289 
 Requisitions, known to the French as les ravitaillements, were the most important, 
and most felt, feature of the controlled economy.  As previously discussed, they could 
extend to everything from food products – which were most common – to lumber, coal, 
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horses, or leather.290  Simultaneously providing for the needs of France and the 
occupying German forces, as well as those goods requisitioned and sent on to Germany 
or Italy, proved a strain on French resources and often resulted in shortages, as 
competition for goods skyrocketed.  As also previously discussed, the solution devised 
for this problem was a system of rationing.   
 Rationing was the natural extension of a controlled economy and meant that 
control extended to consumption.  By determining who could consume how much of any 
given product, rationing was intended to maximize on limited availabilities so that, even 
with the heightened wartime competition for goods, everyone was guaranteed some 
portion of France’s production.  Unfortunately this proved largely unsuccessful and 
shortages, rather than equal distribution, were more often the result of requisitioning.   
 These shortages varied in intensity and duration, depending on time and place.  
Substitutes and additional supplies were more widely and readily available in the 
countryside, closer to the original production point.  No travel was necessary to obtain 
goods already close at hand, and the relationships necessary for trade (legal and 
extralegal) were already likely to be in place.  Monocultural versus polycultural 
traditions, already alluded to, also had a significant effect on how a region weathered 
times of scarcity.291  Some regions of France were simply better equipped to sustain 
themselves than others.  The Limousin, for example, which historian Shannon Fogg 
chose to study for its alleged ordinariness, did not specialize in any particular product, but 
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produced mixed agriculture and thus fared much better, longer than many nearby 
southern provinces.292   
 Primary sources are revealing as to the disparities that emerged, in particular 
between urban centers and the countryside.  Alfred Fabre-Luce and Henri Drouot, in 
Paris and Dijon respectively, each discuss the prices and availabilities of foodstuffs 
virtually to the exclusion of all else.  They tracked their local markets with an almost 
obsessive concern.  Their journals are filled with the changing price of vegetables and the 
beleaguered search for potatoes.  Marie-Louise Osmont of Périers, Normandy, and Louis 
Guilloux of St. Brieuc, Brittany, by contrast, practically never mention the markets.  
Their testimonies are instead a record of their changing feelings and those experienced by 
the larger society around them. 
 Paris and Dijon are both located in fertile, strongly polycultural regions, Ile-de-
France and Burgundy.  Thus Fabre-Luce and Drouot were not suffering because 
production was focused in the wrong direction as would have been the case in a 
monocultural region (for example the area around Nîmes, which specializes in wine, ran 
into shortages as early as summer 1940), but rather due to their urban environment.293  
Cities lacked the direct access naturally available to those in the countryside and suffered 
as a result. 
 Disparities between cities and country were very real.  In 1946, with France still 
reeling from the effects of occupation but beginning to make slow steps towards 
recovery, the average daily caloric intake in rural regions was close to 3000 calories.  In 
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Paris it was 2335, and in Marseilles 2242.294  Specific examples illustrate this disparity 
even better – whereas the average daily intake of butter in rural areas was some 27 grams, 
in Paris it was only 13 grams and in Marseilles 2.3.295  This shows not only the 
differences based on population, but also based on polycultural versus monocultural 
traditions.  Marseilles, located in the monocultural south, recovered much slower than 
Paris, in the fertile and prolific north. 
 The black market was the system developed to combat scarcity and meet 
demands.  In doing so, it forged the strongest connection between the countryside and the 
cities.  Interdependence intertwined the two entities at unprecedented levels as foreign 
imports became nonexistent and a reliance on domestic production and distribution 
became essential.  City-dwellers rediscovered country cousins, with whom they began 
barter relationships, agricultural provisions for manufactured goods, or sometimes based 
on the promise of future payment.296  Many of these relationships were not strictly 
familial, and some were even invented entirely.  These colis familiaux combined with the 
trains des haricots to supplement the meager diet that often confronted Frenchmen living 
in towns and cities, which would otherwise have had only the legal markets to rely on. 
 Ironically, pursuing goods through extralegal means often meant that legally 
obtained supplies were much harder to find and, as a result, more expensive.  It became 
cyclical – because available supplies were limited at legal markets in cities, France’s 
urban populations began scouring the countryside directly, bicycling to nearby locations 
and taking the train to more distant ones.  They also developed or strengthened existing 
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ties to those in the countryside in a position to supply them with goods, most notably in 
the form of colis familiaux, packages sent ostensibly between families to supplement the 
caloric intake of those living in the cities.  They were also willing to pay very high prices.  
City dwellers thus enabled the black market to flourish, and even to overtake the regular, 
legal market.  Since urbanites were willing to come to them and pay high prices, farmers 
and other suppliers were able to benefit from the black market far more than they did at 
government-regulated prices.  Thus more and more goods were diverted into extralegal 
channels, causing even those who had initially relied on legal means of obtaining goods 
to resort to the black market, thereby perpetuating the cycle.   
City/Country Tensions 
 
 The development of the black market displayed vividly the natural imbalance 
between France’s cities and countryside.  While defeat followed by foreign occupation 
did not in itself cause these tensions, it exacerbated what already simmered beneath the 
surface of French society.  Long before even the French Revolution, urban and rural 
France had been at odds.  Though perhaps close geographically, the two were more often 
worlds apart – each viewed the other with a mix of hostility, curiosity and distrust. 
 This persistent tension occasionally bordered on a paranoid – even xenophobic – 
fear.  The Vanishing Children of Paris written by Arlette Farge and Jacques Revel, relates 
how this could occur. 297  The book recounts an episode in Paris in 1750, when reports of 
children being arrested by civil authorities circulated throughout the city.  Paranoia 
quickly devolved into virtually citywide rioting, as the rumors proved to be at least 
partially substantiated.  The episode is revealing of a prevailing, and pervasive, bias held 
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by city dwellers against their provincial neighbors.  As suspicions were cast everywhere 
and misgivings rose, “the most entrenched prejudices re-emerged...[The] fear of seeing 
an influx of vagrants and delinquents into the city was exacerbated.”298  Widely feared 
roving gangs of anarchic peasants were suspected to be the orchestrators behind the 
perceived threat.  Indeed, the main reason that the incident provoked such a response 
from the Parisians was that it was not the roving, migrant population – paysans who 
routinely wandered in and out of the city looking for work in times of scarcity – but 
rather the children of established urban citizens who were targeted.299  Outsiders, in 
particularly the barbarous, uncouth peasantry, were the ultimate threat.  The lines 
between city and country had already been firmly drawn, and to the city dwellers, it was 
clear whose children were more important. 
 This inbred suspicion of outsiders came to play a large role in the Revolution of 
1789.  Eminent Revolutionary historian Georges Lefebvre traces the outbreak of the 
Great Fear in the rural provinces in his work The Great Fear of 1789.300  Though 
circumstances obviously differed considerably between 1789 and the 1940’s, there are a 
surprising number of comparisons that can be drawn based on his findings.  The most 
important, and most striking, of these are the festering tensions between the cities and the 
countryside.  During the occupation, there was a persistent belief held by city folk that 
farmers and their country neighbors were hoarding supplies, keeping the bulk of the 
goods for themselves.  This belief was nothing new.  At the Estates-General in 1789, 
many of the representatives believed that the peasants were not to be trusted, that theirs 
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was a “pretended poverty…and behind the rags, [they led] a peaceful life, often 
comfortable, sometimes even affluent.”301  It was assumed that farmers were jealously 
hoarding supplies.302  And the misgivings went both ways.  France’s rural residents 
assumed that brigands were coming from the city’s to menace their lands and crops.303 
 These suspicions always carried with them a kernel of truth, which allowed them 
to persist through centuries.  In the Revolutionary period, peasants did want to protect 
their crops and keep enough to feed their families and hopefully turn a profit – hence the 
image of hoarding.  Those in the cities saw that, while they might lack bread if it did not 
make it to the marketplace, the peasants producing the wheat had plenty and they wanted 
a share of the production.  Eventually this even became the job of the Revolutionary 
Army, formed in 1792 to scour the countryside for hoarded supplies for the deprived 
citizenry.  The distance between roving bandits and the Revolutionary Army is not a 
large leap either.  Little had changed by the 1940’s.  Accusations of hoarding were still 
hurled at farmers.  Farmers and others in supply positions still regarded city dwellers 
scouring for goods with barely veiled hostility. 
 Urban and rural tensions, then, are ancient and ingrained.  Given a successful crop 
and the ability to trade, it seems that most country and city-folk were willing to cooperate 
in what was a mutually beneficial relationship, based on supply and demand.  The 
uncertainty of the crop, or perhaps more importantly the uncertain ability to access it, 
however, inevitably led to divisions and mounting social tensions, whether in the 
eighteenth century or the twentieth. 
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 This can be read, as in The Vanishing Children of Paris, as hostility towards 
outsiders.  Whether country-to-city or city-to-country, both cases illustrate a population 
that feels that what is rightfully and necessarily theirs is threatened by unfamiliar people.  
An excellent example of this comes from the classic children’s story, Stone Soup.304  In 
the story, three soldiers are trudging through the countryside back from war.  They are 
hungry and tired when they approach a village.  The villagers, seeing the soldiers draw 
near and fearing strangers, hide all of their supplies and when the soldiers ask for food, 
they refuse, saying there was simply nothing left.  Suspecting they had been duped, the 
soldiers turn the tables, declaring instead that they should all make stone soup.  The 
villagers, impressed that soup could come from a stone, are swayed by the soldiers and 
slowly empty their stores of supplies into the soup, eventually creating a feast.  Though a 
children’s tale, Stone Soup is revelatory of the ingrained distrust of outsiders prevalent 
throughout France.  It also provides grounds for this inherent suspicion – the soldiers do 
trick the villagers into giving away their supplies, after all.  The most important aspect of 
Stone Soup though, is that it reinforces the tradition of distrust and illustrates its 
omnipresence. 
 The city reigned victorious over the countryside for much of the nineteenth 
century, and seemed to reach its zenith under the metropolitan Third Republic.  France’s 
republic was urban, intellectual, and interested in progressing alongside of the rest of the 
industrial world.  Industry required dense populations, which led to the development of 
urban centers in areas that had not existed before, and the expansion of those that had.  
Intellectuals flocked to cities as the hubs of learning – newspapers and universities were 
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almost invariably based in urban centers.  Paris, in particular, became the center not just 
of French culture, but of world culture, as the arts reached new heights along the banks of 
the Seine.  The city held the attractions of the modern world, of progress, while the 
countryside came to represent the old, agriculturally dependent world of pre-imperial 
days. 
 In the tumultuous 1930’s though, this vision of France began to be called into 
question.  Urbanism had not spared France from the effects of the Depression.  In 1931 it 
hit France, sending it spiraling into poverty and chaos, along with the rest of the Western 
world.305  Nor was France exempt from the rising tensions in Europe, as fascism and 
communism came to a head and forced the hardening of party lines on both sides.  Added 
to this was a mounting fear of depopulation in France, whose birth rate was far below that 
of its neighbors, most notably Germany.306  Together these factors gave rise to 
peasantism, a movement that began in the 1930’s.   Founded in 1928, the Parti Agraire et 
Paysan Française began to gain political power as the Depression threw light on these 
mounting issues and gave voice to the resentments of France’s rural populations.307 
 Thus when Vichy came to power in June 1940 – a political event that has been 
called by many revenge against the Popular Front – the landed peasant was already on the 
rise.  Vichy’s policy was aimed at continuing and expanding this trend.  Travail, famille, 
patrie replaced the traditional liberté, égalité, fraternité.308  Vichy capitalized on the 
image of the peasant to promote the virtues of the country at the expense of the urban rot 
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and corruption of the Third Republic.  Vichy’s endorsement of the peasant went beyond 
lip service, to actually offering subsidies to families willing to restore and revitalize 
abandoned farmland.309  Hearty peasant families were allegedly more likely to have 
children, saving France’s aging population while simultaneously providing new 
agricultural workers.310  Returning to the soil was meant to simultaneously revitalize 
France and gain the support of the French people, by returning to the traditions that had 
originally made France grand. 
 Like most of Vichy’s policies, however, re-aggrandizing the countryside failed.  
For one thing, it failed to win over the hearts and minds of its target audience, many of 
whom remained personally loyal to Marshall Pétain, but hostile to the government as a 
whole, including its policies.311  The countryside, particularly in the Occupied Zone 
farther away from the influence of Vichy, did not buy into its rhetoric and as 
disillusionment with the government grew, so too did disenchantment with its policies.  
More importantly, Vichy’s need to get food from the reluctant countryside to fill 
requisition quotas put the two seriously at odds.312  A declaration of production was 
required by law, so that government officials could accurately predict and fill requisition 
orders, but in response farmers simply took to concealing how much they had or were 
likely to produce so that official government quotas for collection were set unnaturally 
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low.313  The vested interest of the farmers lay in thwarting attempts at official seizure, 
thus holding back more supplies for themselves and for illegal sales. 
 To a certain degree the countryside did indeed reach its ascendancy during the 
occupation, and unquestionably at the expense of the cities.  As has been discussed 
extensively, the countryside played a crucial role in France’s domestic economy, as the 
country turned inwards during the war years.  Lacking access to most foreign trade, local 
production took center stage as it had in the pre-industrial world.  This exacerbated pre-
existent tensions with cities, used to ready access to goods, both foreign and domestic.  
Competition for scarce resources increased these tensions as the occupation continued.  
The two groups “were thrown together by the dependence of the townspeople on extra 
food from the countryside, and this caused resentment to flow” in both directions.314  
Tensions similar to those described by Georges Lefebvre at the outbreak of the French 
Revolution took hold.  Urbanites thought that those in the countryside were selfishly 
hoarding extra supplies.  Those in the countryside, farmers in particular, felt menaced by 
city dwellers, looking for supplies they were not always willing (or able) to share.  
Nonetheless, the two became increasingly dependent on each other.  The countryside, 
obviously, fed the cities and kept them at least somewhat nourished through the 
occupation.  Supplies might ebb and flow, but the connection between supplier and 
demander remained constant.  City dwellers, in turn, paid for the rise of the countryside.  
Their depleting resources financed what some scholars have painted as the revenge of the 
countryside.  While they grew poor in search of increasingly scarce goods, farmers and 
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suppliers purportedly profited, storing the large sums of cash they accumulated until after 
the war. 
 Although the countryside did profit off of the increased needs of the cities, it is 
important not to over-exaggerate the positive effect this had on rural France.  As the cost 
of food rose, so too did the cost of everything else.  Fuel prices soared, as did the price of 
other essentials – fertilizers or mechanical equipment like tractors, for example.315  
Though the average price that goods could be sold at increased an incredible 216% 
between 1939 and 1943, the price of goods necessary to facilitate agricultural production 
rose even higher – some 308%.316 
“Presence and Absence”317 
 
 Economics were not the only source of tension between the countryside and 
cities.  A majority of the French prisoners of war were from rural areas.318  Of the 
roughly 1.5 million POWs, 450,000 were either farmers or otherwise involved in 
agriculture.319  This left France’s rural citizens with a bitter taste in their mouths, 
imagining themselves to have paid the heaviest costs of the war, that they alone had 
suffered for all of France.  Given that a large portion of France’s population was urban, 
this sense of disproportionately was not entirely unfounded.   
 The absence plagued the countryside with a physical void, a dearth of young men.  
This void had inevitable effects on production, which had difficulty picking up the slack 
demanded by the localizing nature of the occupation when integral workers were absent – 
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just as foreign imports dropped off, 450,000 valuable members of the labor force also 
disappeared.  This absence should not be over-exaggerated – compared to the emptiness 
wrought by the First World War, 1.5 million men missing nationwide did not compare to 
the massive depopulation that erased virtually an entire generation.   
 POWs were not the only Frenchmen to go missing, although they were perhaps 
the most notable.  When German authorities saw that mass executions (unsurprisingly) 
deteriorated relations between the occupier and the occupied and made France reluctant 
to collaborate economically, they switched to a policy of mass deportations instead.320  
This policy was specifically designed to target already marginalized members of society, 
those that Germany described as the common enemy: Jews and communists, or the 
“Jewish Bolsheviks” as they were referred to, to instill a sense that they were working in 
collusion.321  By targeting these groups, the majority of Frenchmen were left largely 
unscathed and therefore more likely to remain complacent, even if begrudgingly so.  
Eventually it was the manner in which these deportations were conducted that could not 
help but draw widespread public attention – specifically the deportation of children to 
supposed work camps.322 
 While the countryside suffered from absence and those on society’s margins bore 
the brunt of contentions, the cities balked under a new presence.  Urban centers were the 
hubs of Germans in France.  Paris in particular served as headquarters for the German 
military command, under Otto von Stulpnagel, and after 1942, his cousin Carl-Heinrich 
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von Stulpnagel.323  Situated on Avenue Kléber in Paris’ wealthy 16th arrondissement gave 
them a privileged experience of and access to the city.324  High-ranking officers were not 
the only Germans in France; rather soldiers and officers alike “clustered around ports, 
railways and main roads” of France’s cities.  The administration, akin to a colonial 
government, was such that at least some German presence was assured in every city in 
Occupied France, although the actual size of this presence varied greatly depending on 
the relative importance of any given city.325  As France’s largest city and Germany’s 
local command headquarters, Paris naturally had the highest population of Germans – 
40,000 troops as of 1940.326  Soldiers were not the only addition to the population – 
imported labor worked both ways, and some 80,000 German civilians were brought into 
France for construction projects.327  Their most notable achievement was the Atlantic 
Wall, designed to impede seaborne Allied invasions. 
 The magnitude of German presence hinged on two important factors: time and 
geography.  In December 1941 there were 100,000 German troops in France; by spring 
1942 that number had dropped to 40,000; by spring 1944 it had risen to a million men.328  
Soldiers were needed initially to ensure that occupation ran smoothly at the beginning.  
By 1942 these soldiers were gravely needed on the Eastern Front and divisions in France 
were often older men, less physically capable of contributing actively to the war effort in 
the east.  In the spring of 1944, the Germans were preparing for an anticipated Allied 
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landing, and therefore began to mass unprecedented levels of troops in France, 
particularly in the north and along the coast.   
 At any given time, though, these troops were in different areas.  Most towns and 
villages only saw German troops at the beginning and end of the war, as in the interim 
they had little cause to move around the country.  Some places, however, were subject to 
continual heavy German presence regardless of their population size, by virtue of their 
location.  The case of Périers, Normandy has already been used to illustrate this.  It 
occupied a strategic potential landing point for Allied invasions, and thus acquired an 
importance that had nothing to do with the size of its population or whether or not it 
served as an administrative center.  A comparably sized town in the heart of France 
would never have experienced the same kind of presence. 
 An interesting aspect of the German presence, though, is that as time wore on the 
French became almost immune to it, at least in the realm of the public world.  Ironically, 
this growing immunity developed at the same time as the oppression of the occupation 
intensified, in particular after the end of 1941.329  Historian Ian Ousby describes the 
phenomenon saying, “And so the alien presence, increasingly hate and feared in private, 
could seem so permanent that, in public places where daily life went on, it was taken for 
granted.  It grew invisible.”330 
Collaboration/Resistance  
 Ostensibly, it would seem simple to define collaboration or resistance.  Placed in 
the context of occupation France, though, only the most overt instances of either are truly 
easy to define.  Particularly in terms of collaboration, motivation heightens the issue and 
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increases the difficulty of making clear divisions.  The problems of arriving at formal, 
fixed definitions for either term reflects the changing landscape they occupied as the war 
progressed and opinions changed.  Collaboration and resistance were fluid and 
changeable and perhaps the most important aspects of defining them, motive and intent, 
are virtually impossible to come by, particularly in the light of hindsight.   
 Thus far resistance and collaboration have been examined in terms of the forms 
they could take – what a collaborator might do in a factory in the banlieues outside Paris, 
or who might become a resistor in the backwoods of rural France.331  It is important to 
understand, however, that choices to resist or collaborate were not made in a vacuum.  
They were dependent on external, political events.  Sometimes it is easy to forget that 
while Frenchmen and women went about their daily lives for five years, war was raging 
elsewhere in Europe, and, indeed, most of the world.  These events, though far removed 
geographically, carried great importance and dictated the directions that individuals in 
France chose. 
 When the resistance movement began in the summer and fall of 1940, it was little 
more than a sporadic, unorganized movement.  It had little chance of having any real 
affect on the occupying forces.  “Resistance requires some hope, and until late in the 
war” there was very little to be had.332  The resistance movement stalled getting off the 
ground in 1940 for a number of reasons.  Much of the strength and organization of later 
resistance movements came from French communists, but in 1940, the French 
Communist Party was in tatters.  To begin with, it had been officially outlawed in 
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September 1939.333  Leadership, then, was in question, and officially the party did not 
even exist to mount any effective resistance.  Far more debilitating, though, was the 
rampant confusion within the party caused by the Nazi-Soviet Pact made weeks earlier, in 
August 1939.334  The treaty, which pledged neutrality between the two nations should 
either be attacked by a third party, bewildered and concerned all of Europe’s communists.  
Since its birth, National Socialism had been the natural enemy of communists.  Now that 
the once hostile groups had become cordial (or at least non-aggressive), communists in 
France, and throughout Europe, did not know whether to treat Germany as friend or foe.  
The situation became even more complex for French communists in May and June 1940 
when Germany invaded – was it right to fight and protect the nation?  Or follow the 
dictates from Moscow and remain passive in the face of German aggression?  This 
widespread confusion bred inactivity and effectively kept the communists out of the 
resistance movement until late June 1941.   On June 22, Nazi Germany launched 
Operation Barbarossa and invaded the Soviet Union, thus clarifying the position of 
Europe’s communist community, as the uneasy bedfellows returned to their natural state 
of mutual enmity. 
 Not only communists, but the rest of France’s political Left, the natural leaders of 
any resistance movement, had been left devastated and in disarray after the turbulent 
1930’s.335  First the Depression hit and the global economy was in shambles.336  The 
Popular Front, a coalition government embracing many left-leaning groups including 
socialists and communists, stepped in to take the lead of the Third Republic in 1934.  Led 
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by the widely respected Leon Blum, the government was beset with problems from its 
inception.  The economic crisis brought unemployment and labor wages, which resulted 
in a massive general strike in June 1936.337  When the Spanish Civil War broke out a 
month later it posed a moral dilemma for the nation, but in particular the Popular Front 
government.  Eventually a course of non-intervention was determined, but this was 
deemed counterintuitive to the liberal principles of the government, and only further 
undermined its authority.338  When their finances began to deteriorate in 1937, there was 
little the coalition government could do, and they were voted out of power a year later.339  
When the conservative, rightist Vichy government founded l’Etat Français, it was the 
final nails in the coffin of the Popular Front.340 
 Leftist uncertainty was not the only stumbling block to mounting an effective 
resistance.  Vichy presented an additional puzzle, especially in the Free Zone.  With the 
Vichy government advocating collaboration and the jurisdiction not yet ironed out 
between Vichy and German authorities in the earliest days of Occupation, it could be 
difficult to know for sure who you were resisting.341  Did an act taken against the 
Germans necessarily put you in conflict with Pétain and Vichy?  Prior to 1942 this 
presented a large obstacle to resistors in the Free Zone.  In the Occupied Zone, and 
particularly in the Forbidden Zone, these lines were more clearly drawn.  Historian 
Richard Cobb suggests that, especially in the case of the Nord Pas de Calais in the 
Forbidden Zone, their experience of the war made the necessary moral position clear 
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early: “Patriotism came easily to a frontier region always the first to experience the fire of 
war and invasion.”342  After facing the brunt of German invasion and occupation in both 
World War One and Two, even being virtually isolated from the rest of France under a 
military governorship, the Forbidden Zone’s position was clear. 
 While the case for resisting may have been weak in most parts of France in 1940, 
the case for collaborating virtually made itself.  The German victory in June 1940 had 
shocked everyone, including the Germans, in its speed and totality.  One historian 
observed that, “In 1919 the Germans attacked Verdun for ten months without taking 
it…in 1940 the Germans took Verdun in little more than a day.”343  Everywhere France 
lost quickly and totally, decimating what little morale the French had possessed going 
into the war.  Defeat was almost a relief when it came.  “The most important feature of 
the French defeat was that it left much of the population with a sense that it still had 
something to lose.”344  It instilled the French with a sense of German invincibility and 
their own ineffectiveness.  For many, the only logical thing to do in the face of such 
defeat was to return to normal life. 
 Returning to normalcy, however, was not as black and white as it might seem.  
“The most elementary promptings of normalcy in the summer of 1940, the urge to return 
to home and job, started many Frenchmen down a path of everyday complicity that led 
gradually and eventually to active assistance in German measures.”345  Rebuilding roads, 
reopening factories were all aids to the German occupation of France.  While France may 
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have wanted to do these things for herself, the knowledge that they were simultaneously 
aiding the occupying power was inescapable.  In 1940, though, collaboration seemed to 
many like the best, most realistic option.  It was undoubtedly only a matter of time before 
Britain fell and virtually all Europe was under German dominion.  Then France would 
receive preferential treatment in the new European order that would arise for having 
submitted first and quietly.346  Collaboration was not only expedient, it was advisable. 
 As the war changed though, so too did ideas regarding the advisability of 
collaboration.  During the summer and fall of 1940, collaboration was at its most popular.  
From there, it began slipping.  The decline was neither constant nor steady, but by late 
1942 the tide had turned decisively from collaboration and towards resistance.  Domestic 
and foreign events both played a part in this shift.  Abroad, the German army had begun 
to experience setbacks – the possibility that it was not invincible began to seem real.  
German soldiers suffered tremendous losses at the hands of the Soviets at Stalingrad, in 
what was becoming a bloody war of attrition.  Axis forces advancing in North Africa had 
been stopped at El Alamein in a decisive move by the Allied powers. Weaknesses began 
to show in the once impregnable Germans hide.  
 At the same time, the situation within France itself was growing increasingly dire.  
In November 1942, the German army in France launched Case Anton, which completed 
the invasion and occupation begun in 1940.  The Free Zone joined the Occupied Zone 
and all of France was under German dominion.  1942 and the total occupation also saw a 
marked change in German policies in France. In spring 1942, the job of policing France 
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was transferred from the regular army to the SS.347  1942 also saw the beginning and the 
high-water mark of the deportation of France’s Jews to camps in the east, including the 
infamous round-ups that occurred in Paris in July.348 
 Indeed, 1942 can be pinpointed as the turning point in the French occupation.  “A 
crude graph of French public opinion from 1940 to 1944 would show nearly universal 
acceptance of Marshal Pétain in June 1940 and nearly universal acceptance of General de 
Gaulle in August 1944” – the turning point was 1942.349  1942 was the year when an 
organized, rural resistance truly began to take hold.350  In 1940 and 1941, resistance had 
been an individual and desperate act, built on symbolism rather than efficacy.  It had 
occurred mainly in the cities where occupation rankled earlier and harder. 
 Throughout 1942 and 1943, though, despite the fact that most French citizens 
were turning against Vichy, the resistance movement was still a small, relatively limited 
group – “people were more concerned with the hardships caused by rationing.”351  
Approval for and sympathy with the resistance grew at a much faster rate than new 
recruits joined.  Disliking Vichy or disapproving of collaboration did not in itself create 
resistors.352  By 1944 this pattern changed.  At that point, Allied victory seemed not only 
likely, but imminent.  Just as collaboration had been attractive to opportunists in 1940, 
resistance now took on a cache to those with an eye towards the future.  Collaboration, in 
turn, reached an all time low in participation and popularity – public opinion had turned 
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completely against Vichy and its policies.  During 1944, the resistance movement was at 
its most active and its most populous.   
 A separate cause for this, aside from the changing patterns of war outside France, 
may have been that at this point the occupation again intensified.  It had been in place 
since June 1940 and by 1944 shortages were felt nationwide; no region or town was 
immune any longer.  It was also by far the most dangerous year to be in France, in 
particular during the spring and summer.353  For the first time since 1940, German troops 
were moving on a colossal scale.  This time, however, it was not as the victorious 
conquerors, but as soldiers actively at war, and they were thus keen to avoid major roads 
and thoroughfares, which were more likely to attract Allied bombers.  This is the period 
during which the only major atrocities in the occupation occurred, the best example being 
the massacre at Oradour-sur-Glane in the Limousin on June 10, 1944, when 642 people 
were killed.  The intensifying occupation and the weakening of the Germans on other 
fronts combined to inspire French resistance to escalate just as the occupation was 
reaching its closing stages. 
 Some historians have argued that the black market was an act of resistance.  
While participating in the black market certainly went against Vichy’s policies, there are 
several problems with this claim.  Evidence confirms that though Vichy officially 
condemned the black market, it also recognized the necessity of its existence.  A law 
promulgated in 1942, for example, intended to regulate the black market specifically 
omitted any mention of using the market for personal needs.354  Many, if not all, Vichy 
officials participated in it themselves.  German soldiers were also key participants in the 
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black market.  The black market was simply the natural response to a forced, controlled 
economy, without ideological undertones.  Proof of this lies in the black markets that 
sprang up even in those states not under occupation.355  
Social Class 
 According to some sources, the occupation, and in particular the black market, 
were responsible for an odd social inversion in France.356  Education, long held at a 
premium in French culture took a backseat to more practical connections – farmers and 
grocers, for example, had easier access to resources than the educated elite by virtue of 
their work.  However the educated elite were also those citizens most likely to keep 
memoirs, thus “historians are particularly aware of their suffering.”357  Indeed, virtually 
all of the primary sources available from the occupation period are written by members of 
the upper or middle classes.  Marie-Louise Osmont married a doctor from a wealthy 
family and inherited the ancestral estate along with the local prestige attached to it.  Henri 
Drouot was a history professor at the University of Dijon.  Louis Guilloux and Alfred 
Fabre-Luce were both well-established writers.   
 Did the educated elite have a markedly different experience of occupation?  Or 
were they simply more accustomed to recording their thoughts?  Did those with truly 
horrific struggles not have the luxury of putting pen to paper to record their experiences?  
Not that education guaranteed surviving the war unscathed – Drouot and Fabre-Luce 
experienced firsthand the deprivation in France’s cities, while Osmont was obligated to 
quarter soldiers belonging to a foreign power for over four years.  It seems likely the 
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preponderance of sources from this group reflects tendencies within that group, rather 
than any great differentiation from France as a whole. 
 Any social inversion that did occur was limited.  Money was the best tool for 
survival during the occupation.  The right amount of money made anything possibly 
somehow, even when France was plagued by nationwide scarcity late in the war.358  In 
this sense, the occupation had not changed anything.  Those with money still had access 
to goods if they were willing to pay a high price and those without it did not.  Certainly 
this aspect of the occupation shows a significant continuity, rather than change.  Money 
eased the pains of occupation, and lacking it augmented them considerably. 
Socio-economic conditions had tangible effects on women’s experience of the 
occupation.  It dictated the way in which they interacted with German soldiers, and the 
way in which the government responded to their interactions.  “The reports of rape in 
Paris came from working-class districts….both the French and German authorities seem 
to have taken rape most seriously when bourgeois women were involved.”359   
 Working class women were more likely to have contact with soldiers by virtue of 
their jobs – the Germans frequented cafés and hotels throughout France and it was often 
the barmaids, waitresses, or cleaning ladies in these institutions who were reported to 
have sexual relationships with German soldiers.360  Access and opportunity were essential 
ingredients.  These women were readily available and, because they were not of a high 
social class, were considered legitimate targets.  It would have been nearly impossible for 
these working class women to avoid some interaction with German soldiers.  
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Furthermore, they were often likely to be the children of unwed or single mothers 
themselves.361  Many of these women could not help but see a relationship with a German 
soldier as an opportunity – while the Germans were the dominant power in France it 
offered several advantages.  These ranged from specialized access to goods to an elevated 
importance in society.  
 Unlike the romanticized image of cross cultural love blossoming in the small, 
provincial town of Nevers portrayed in the 1959 film Hiroshima, Mon Amour, 
relationships between French women and German men tended to flourish in large urban 
areas that had high concentrations of German soldiers.362  This provided not only the 
necessary opportunity, but also anonymity, which was extremely important for 
protection, as the French public remained stolidly opposed to such liaisons. 
 Class differences also colored choices regarding collaboration and resistance.  
One historian described the “typical” collaborator as an upper to middle-class, urban 
male.363  Again, part of this stereotype was subject to opportunity.  Urbanites would have 
had more access to means of collaboration, whether simply through contact with German 
soldiers or more nuanced paths.  The documentary The Sorrow and the Pity by Marcel 
Ophuls implies that the bourgeois were largely neutral, as they had the most to lose, 
leaving those at the bottom and top of society as the foremost collaborators.364  This 
somewhat contradictory picture leaves us with collaborators who had either the most to 
gain or the most to offer. 
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 Historiography tends to generalize class as a determinant for collaboration or 
resistance far more than was likely the case.  In hindsight class-consciousness has been 
introduced where perhaps it never existed.  For example, because labor parties were 
suppressed in Nazi Germany, it would therefore have supposedly been impossible for any 
of France’s working class to enter into any kind of resistance, out of proletariat 
solidarity.365  Collaboration, then, was allegedly restricted to capitalists, in particular 
business leaders, and resistance was the realm of the working class, who purportedly saw 
their cause as a cross-European crusade.366  Obviously this viewpoint is not only 
anachronistic but seriously misleading.  “Not all leading industrialists were collaborators, 
any more than all workers were members of the Resistance.”367  Suggesting otherwise not 
only generalizes what were undoubtedly personal and circumstantial decisions, but also 
grossly overpopulates both the collaboration and resistance movements, neither of which 
ever had any such overwhelming numbers. 
Conclusion 
 It is significant, and intentional, that all the journals I have used as primary 
sources are from four very different places.  Paris, Dijon, St. Brieuc and Périers are all 
important by virtue of their vantage point on the occupation, but none shared exactly the 
same experience.  Together, they provide a nuanced picture of the occupation, 
specifically as it occurred in Ile-de-France, Brittany, Normandy, and Burgundy, four of 
the major provinces in the Occupied Zone.  Additionally, although each belongs to the 
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upper class, no source is quite like the other, and thus not only four distinct regions, but 
four distinct visions of France are presented. 
 Once compiled, the picture that emerges shows the links between the material, 
political and social situations that persisted under the occupation.  Where material 
resources were limited, discontent was high, but those who stood to gain by the 
occupation often did so.  Take for example the black market and the role it played in the 
rise of the countryside.  While many paysans suffered through the occupation, others 
were able to navigate the extralegal markets to offset their losses in the rising costs of 
equipment with unprecedented revenues from desperate town and city dwellers. 
 The links between the city and the country also emerge as part of the image of 
Occupied France.  Many things bound them together, in particular economic and social 
ties.  While these ties differed from region to region, what was constant throughout were 
the links and the lack of separation between the urban and rural experiences of 
occupation.   
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Conclusion 
 
 In many ways, the German occupation of France between 1940 and 1944 served 
to reinforce trends that already existed.  Social stratification came to the foreground as 
the prime importance of money and connections was reemphasized in the heightened 
competition for resources.  Tensions between cities and the countryside – in place long 
before the occupation, if largely dormant – were reignited as the supremacy of the city 
was tested and strained by scarcity.  Hostility towards outsiders and the unknown also 
reemerged with new potency – the occupying German and the unknown Frenchman were 
equally subject to this antagonism.  Continuity persisted, even in the face of occupation. 
 In other ways, however, life in France changed drastically with the occupation.  
Even while social stratification retained its former importance, the black market was 
opening new avenues for social advancement for the enterprising farmer or merchant.  
The black market served the additional purpose of establishing new links, both trade and 
familial.  These links built, and in some cases rebuilt, bonds between the city and country 
at the same moment that these same bonds were coming under threat from scarcity and 
competition. 
 Several factors that determined the experience of occupation can be identified: 
geography, population density, agricultural traditions, social class, pre-war conditions, 
and ingenuity.   These variables shaped the way the occupation appeared in different 
places and to different people.  
 Geography played an important strategic role.  Those Frenchmen living in the 
Nord Pas de Calais were subjected to a total military occupation from the outset of the 
war, due to their tactically important location close to the Belgian border and in the initial 
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German line of assault.  Compounding this was the industrial importance of the region, 
which was home to a number of factories put to use towards the German war effort.  
Southern provinces like the Limousin or the Auvergne, by contrast, had a substantially 
different experience.  The south of France was not integrated into the Occupied Zone 
until November 1942, and even then the German presence was limited.368  Landlocked 
regions in the economically dependent south simply held less importance for the 
occupying Germans. 
 Population density could often transform what would otherwise be a strategically 
unimportant area.  France’s urban centers, whether landlocked or coastal trading hubs, 
became the focus of the German occupation.  Each had its own German regional 
administration, designed to correspond to the existing French administration.369  While 
the center of the occupation was Paris, other cities like Tours, Bordeaux, Nantes and Lille 
were all important centers, focuses of interaction between the occupier and the occupied 
and conduits for resistance and collaboration. 
 Agricultural traditions often followed the lines of geography and were extremely 
important to a region’s experience of the occupation.  Monoculture, which in peacetime 
would often make an area prosperous from the wine or olive oil trade, became a 
hindrance under the occupation conditions.  Virtually nonexistent foreign trade combined 
with truncated domestic routes often limited regions to what they could produce 
themselves, giving a decisive advantage to those accustomed to tending to diverse crops 
and livestock.  Living in a monocultural region was of course no death sentence – 
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domestic trade was not so damaged that inter-regional trade ceased to function.  It did, 
however, put those areas, in particular their urban centers, at a pronounced disadvantage.  
Marseilles, for example, suffered from greater deprivations than Paris in the north 
because it lacked a proximate self-sufficient agricultural tradition.370 
 Social class and the advantages (or disadvantages) that came with it could easily 
change the face of occupation, no matter where in France you were.  Those who wanted 
something first needed something to trade for it – according to Alfred Fabre-Luce, for 
tobacco it was advisable to bring a chicken; when looking for cement, cheese.371  Wealth 
brought availability, even for those goods scarce or nonexistent to others.372  Thus even 
as the black market was providing new opportunities to France’s farmers or middlemen, 
preexisting wealth still held its natural advantages and allowed those with it to live above 
the daily scramblings and endemic dangers of the black market.  Marie-Louise Osmont 
provides an excellent illustration of this point, as her wealth allowed her to live and eat 
comfortably for the majority of the occupation without once entering in the black market 
herself.373  In this way, France’s pre-war social structure was reinforced. 
 What can be said of the character of the French, as judged by the occupation?  
What emerged from Occupied France was neither widespread national heroism nor 
cowardice, but rather a dogged insistence on carrying on in spite of events.  Even if every 
other factor was stacked against you– geography, regional agricultural traditions, social 
class, etc – with the right mix of opportunity and ingenuity, the occupation could become 
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not only livable but profitable.374  The majority of the French accepted that events beyond 
their control had dictated their loser’s lot and set about not to change the world, but to see 
themselves and their families through the occupation unscathed.  While it may not seem 
particularly heroic, this path does illustrate a national spirit of ingenuity and 
perseverance.375  Out of this spirit, substitutes for missing staples were developed, 
including saccharine for sugar and pedal-powered generators to create electricity at hair 
salons and other businesses.376 
 One central generalization can be made about Occupied France: The urban 
experience of occupation was harder than its rural counterpart.  Rural areas had the 
advantage of proximity to points of production, which generally enabled them to live 
through an occupation less marked by scarcity, and even one that put them in a position 
of economic power for the first time in generations.  Actual, demonstrable changes were 
also simply more present in urban areas – it was here where most of the German soldiers 
in France were gathered, here where administrators were paired with their German 
opposite numbers, where tensions ran the highest.  France’s cities, in particular Paris, 
were also the initial birthplace of both the collaboration and resistance movements.377  
While these movements diversified geographically as the occupation progressed, their 
impetus came from the opportunities available in large urban centers, unavailable in the 
rest of France at the outset of the war. 
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 The overall image of Occupied France, then, is somewhat contradictory.  Was it 
markedly different than France under the Third Republic, or closely parallel?  Certainly 
several of the government officials transferred directly from the ailing Third Republic to 
Vichy’s l’Etat Français.378  Even so, and in spite of certain significant continuities, 
French society had changed.  The spirit and the image of France were permanently 
altered by defeat, by suffering, and most importantly by the questionable and haunting 
legacy of occupation.  One historian wrote that “the moral and psychic wounds were even 
more tender than the material ones,” suggesting the depth of the damage to France’s 
republican identity.379 
 The experience of civilians in Occupied France between 1940 and 1944 set the 
course for the French nation to take for the subsequent several decades.  It became a 
source of national pride and later a source of national shame, and in both it shaped the 
attitudes of contemporary French society towards their past and present.  Today it is still 
debated, as historians and laypeople alike search to find the middle ground that defined 
occupation.  What truly defined occupation, though, was not its ever-evolving legacy.  
Rather it was the day-to-day experiences of French civilians who lived for four years 
under German power and, as a nation, sought to find normalcy and stability in the midst 
of defeat and occupation. 
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